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INTRODUCTION
A specter is haunting notice-and-comment rulemaking—the specter
of fraudulent comments.1 The stand-out example—the apotheosis—was
the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) net neutrality
rulemaking in 2017. Well over twenty million comments were submitted,
but millions of those were highly suspect. It turns out only about 800,000
of those comments were unique—that is, not written by a computer and
not a pre-written form letter or variation thereof.2 And of the rest,
perhaps half were submitted by computers (bots) using fictitious names
or the names of real people, living and dead, who had no connection to
the comment. As described by (dissenting) Commissioner Jessica
Rosenworcel:
[W]hen the agency made the misguided decision to roll back its net
neutrality rules, it did so based on a public record littered with
problems. While millions of Americans sought to inform the FCC
process by filing comments and sharing their deeply-held opinions
about internet openness, millions of other filings in the net neutrality
docket appear to be the product of fraud. As many as nine and a half
1 “Fraudulent” is the standard term. As this article’s title implies, I understand its attraction
but think it is not quite right. See infra Section IV.A.
2 Ryan Singel, Filtering Out the Bots: What Americans Actually Told the FCC About Net
Neutrality Repeal, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018, 6:00 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2018/10/filtering-out-bots-what-americans-actually-told-fccabout-net-neutrality-repeal [https://perma.cc/ZZ78-HHMW].
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million people had their identities stolen and used to file fake
comments, which is a crime under both federal and state laws. Nearly
eight million comments were filed from e-mail domains associated
with FakeMailGenerator.com. On top of this, roughly half a million
comments were filed from Russian e-mail addresses.
Something here is rotten—and it’s time for the FCC to come
clean. 3

That sounds terrible. And, indeed, judging by the furious and
strident reaction, fraudulent comments are a catastrophe. On this
account, these comments are harmful at two levels. On the one hand, they
destroy the integrity of agency decision-making; the outcome of a noticeand-comment process crammed with fraudulent comments—“corrupted
by endemic fraud”4—is at least suspect if not simply invalid per se. And
on the other hand, millions of individuals are being harmed through a
form of “identity theft.” Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro
stated: “The theft of someone’s voice in our democracy cannot stand, and
we must get to the bottom of this massive identity theft. That is a
compelling reason the FCC should not press forward with its action to
rollback Net Neutrality rules.”5 And all of this is not simply bad, it is
illegal. The very terms “fraudulent comments” and “identity theft” state
legal conclusions.
I will suggest that this reaction is over-wrought and rests on a
fundamental misconception of the nature of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. There is nothing good about fake comments; we should not
celebrate them; there is no silver lining; agencies should take steps to
prevent or weed out such submissions to the extent they can do so
without discouraging legitimate comments. But neither are they actually
all that harmful, either to the agency or to the individuals whose names
have been used. And despite the frequent and easy assertions of illegality,
it is not at all clear that any law is being violated. To borrow Cynthia
Nicholas Confessore and Jeremy Singer-Vine on Request for Inspection of Records, 33
FCC Rcd. 11808 (Adopted Nov. 7, 2018) (Rosenworcel, dissenting).
4 Prechtel v. FCC, 330 F. Supp. 3d 320, 332 (D.D.C. 2018).
5 Courtney Linder, Pennsylvania AG Josh Shapiro Joins Lawsuit Against the FCC Over Net
Neutrality Rollback, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.post-gazette.com/
business/tech-news/2018/01/16/josh-shapiro-fcc-net-neutrality-lawsuit-pennsylvania-ajit-pai/
stories/201801160126 [https://perma.cc/9CH8-FX92].
3
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Farina’s memorable analogy: fake comments are like pink eye; they look
really terrible but are not actually that big a problem.6 Anxieties about
other cyber threats that resemble fake comments have made people
hypersensitive in this quite different setting. Threats such as Russian
interference with American elections, bot-disseminated disinformation
on social media platforms, and identity theft are very serious problems
with very real consequences for society and affected individuals. Fake
comments look like those problems and stir the same unease. But they are
just not the same.
I.

THE PROBLEM

In December 2017, the Wall Street Journal published a lengthy
article by James Grimaldi and Paul Overburg7 reporting on work they had
done over several months looking into the docket for the FCC’s net
neutrality rulemaking.8 This was a giant rulemaking with a record
number of public comments: almost twenty-five million.9 The focus of
the article was not that astonishing and unprecedented total, but on the
large number of duplicative, mass, and, most of all, phony (i.e. submitted
under a false name) comments. “They included comments from stolen
6 Cynthia Farina, Remarks at the Administrative Conference of the United States and
Administrative Law Review Symposium: Mass and Fake Comments in Agency Rulemaking 119
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/10-5-18%20Mass%20
and%20Fake%20Comments%20in%20Agency%20Rulemaking%20Transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VFP3-264D].
7 James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overburg, Millions of People Post Comments on Federal
Regulations. Many Are Fake., WALL ST. J. A1 (Dec. 13, 2017).
8 In 2015, the FCC issued its “net neutrality rule,” classifying broadband Internet as a
“telecommunications service.” That classification carries with it common carrier obligations, and
the rule prohibited broadband Internet providers from blocking, degrading, or interfering with
Internet traffic. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19737 (June 12, 2015).
The rule was upheld in United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In
2017, the FCC proposed repealing the 2015 rule. In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom,
WC Docket No. 17-108. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was released in May and published
in the Federal Register in June. 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568 (June 2, 2017).
9 The comment period ran to July 17; the reply period ended August 17. As is typical with
FCC rulemakings, comments continued to flow into the docket well after the nominal deadlines
had passed. As of September 25, 2018, the docket contained 23,951,747 total filings. Docket 17108, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/filings?proceedings_name=17-108&sort=date_
disseminated,DESC [https://perma.cc/S5VP-XSXZ].
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email addresses, defunct email accounts and people who unwittingly gave
permission for their comments to be posted. Hundreds of identities on
fake comments were found in an online catalog of hacks and breaches.”10
A consulting firm later determined that more than a million comments
came through a pornographic website; a third of the comments, 7.75
million, were sent from temporary or disposable email domains through
FakeMailGenerator.com; about 10 million were from senders of multiple
comments.11 The whole thing was a shambles, Exhibit A for those who
view electronic commenting as a farce.
The Journal article received a huge amount of attention and
prompted a number of follow-up stories from many outlets. But the
problem had been perceived well before December. Already in May 2017,
then New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman had launched an
investigation. By his count, the FCC docket included eight million
submissions with “fabricated” identities and one million with “stolen”
identities.12 Schneiderman and his Pennsylvania counterpart, Josh
Shapiro, both created web pages for individuals to report that phony
comments had been submitted to the FCC under their names.13 Each of

10

Grimaldi & Overburg, supra note 7. A video on the newspaper’s website summarizes:

[T]he Wall Street Journal uncovered thousands of comments from fake email
addresses, abandoned or defunct email accounts, posted on behalf of unwitting
participants. For example, 818,000 identical comments on the FCC site favor repealing
the rules. In a random sample of people whose emails were used for those posts, 72%
said they had nothing to do with them. Jack Hirsch was one of them. “I was horrified.
Knowing that this is actually an issue that I cared enough to write my representatives
about, and knowing that my information had been falsified to support a completely
opposing view, it was really frustrating, and honestly, I felt like there was no recourse.
Thousands of Fake Comments on Net Neutrality: A WSJ Investigation, WSJ | VIDEO (Dec. 12,
2017, 12:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/video/thousands-of-fake-comments-on-net-neutralitya-wsj-investigation/8E52172E-821C-4D89-A2AA-2820F30B8648.html [https://perma.cc/7DH4QLT7].
11 EMPRATA, FCC RESTORING INTERNET FREEDOM DOCKET 17-108: COMMENTS ANALYSIS 2
(2017),
https://www.emprata.com/emp2017/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/FCC-RestoringInternet-Freedom-Comments-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVH2-TRSP].
12 Letter from Eric Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., N.Y., to Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Gen. Counsel,
FCC (Dec. 13, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/ltr_to_fcc_gen_counsel_re_records_
request.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3WE-ZTZR].
13 Fake Comments, N.Y. ST. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/fakecomments
[https://perma.cc/FJZ6-R72X]; Fake FCC Comments, OFF. OF THE ATT. GEN.—JOSH SHAPIRO,
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the sites links to the FCC docket, making it easy to search for one’s own
name among the comments. The user can then fill out a simple form
confirming that her name was used by someone else, indicating the
comment number, and stating whether a current or past address was used
in the comment and, “[i]f you have an opinion about whether Title II net
neutrality rules should be left in place or repealed, did the comment
match that view or was it the opposite of your actual view?”14
The FCC Open Internet rulemaking was the most visible and
extreme example of an electronic docket containing comments that were
computer-generated and/or purporting to be from an individual who had
nothing to do with the submission. But the phenomenon is more
widespread than just this one rulemaking. Grimaldi and Overburg
reported on phony comments in rulemakings conducted by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.15
Not surprisingly, politicians took notice. They responded in two
ways. First, and most intensely, opponents of the repeal of the net
neutrality rule latched on to the defects in the notice-and-comment
process in an effort to derail the rulemaking altogether. Many argued that
the process was so compromised that the FCC had to delay or wholly

https://badcomments.attorneygeneral.gov [https://perma.cc/H584-TAWK]. As of July 22, 2020,
the New York page is still up; the Pennsylvania page has been removed.
14 That phrasing is from the New York site. Fake Public Comments Investigation, N.Y. ST.
OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/fakecomments-form [https://perma.cc/9UQJUUTW]. The Pennsylvania site asks whether “[t]he fake comment(s) I found: Matched my real
view, Is/are opposite of my real view, I don’t know / I have no view on net neutrality.” Fake FCC
Comments, supra note 13.
15 Grimaldi & Overburg, supra note 7. Though my focus is on notice-and-comment
rulemaking, identical phenomena occur in other settings where mass online comments are
invited. One prominent example is the process of producing an environmental impact statement
(EIS), which involves public comment on a draft EIS (DEIS) prior to issuance of the final EIS.
For example, a number of comments endorsing a massive Alaska mine have been submitted as
comments on the DEIS in the name of, and with the email address of, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) attorney who is the project’s most prominent opponent. See Dylan
Brown, Lead NEPA Story: Fake Comments vs. Form Letters in Pebble fight, GREENWIRE (June 13,
2019),
https://www.paep.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/National_Desk_June-21-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M9KE-N3ZL]. These submissions raise exactly the same issues as the
comments discussed in this article.
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abandon the rulemaking.16 The FCC was unmoved. Dismissing the
objections, it went ahead with the repeal. In its view, the pseudonyms just
did not matter; what counted was the content of the submissions, not the
signature line.17
Second, many lawmakers have voiced deep concerns. As mentioned,
several state attorneys general (AGs) began investigations. In addition, in
December 2017, several members of the House requested the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the FCC
rulemaking as well as “any other rulemaking processes you deem
appropriate for this review.”18 The letter sought investigation of “the
prevalence of outside parties generating comments to federal
rulemakings by utilizing false or stolen identities,” possible violations of
federal law, and the adequacy of mechanisms agencies have in place to
prevent such submissions.19 GAO agreed to undertake the investigation,
anticipating that it would get underway in May 2018.20 An overlapping
group of Representatives, led by Frank Pallone and Elijah Cummings,
wrote Attorney General Jeff Sessions and FBI Director Christopher Wray,

16 See, e.g., Letter from Ellen F. Rosenblum, Oregon Att’y Gen., et al. to FCC (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ag_letter_12-13-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PUE3-SB9J] (urging the FCC to delay the proceeding in order to investigate
the “tainted comments”) [hereinafter State AGs’ Letter].
17 See, e.g., Letter from Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, to Representative Michael E. Capuano (Apr.
12, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-350373A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZQ5BBWY] (“Despite any suggestion that the public comment process was somehow ‘flawed’ or
‘tampered with’ by the alleged submission of comments under false names, any such activity did
not affect the Commission’s actual decision-making . . . .”); Letter from Thomas M. Johnson, Jr.,
FCC Gen. Counsel, to Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen. (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FCC-General-Counsel-Response-toNYAG.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH2X-A2NF] (“[T]he Commission does not make policy
decisions merely by tallying the comments on either side of a proposal to determine what position
has greater support, nor does it attribute greater weight to comments based on the submitter’s
identity.”).
18 Letter from Representative Gregory Meeks et al. to Honorable Gene Dodaro, Comptroller
Gen. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://meeks.house.gov/sites/meeks.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/125-17%20Meeks%20Letter%20to%20GAO%20on%20Misuse%20of%20Identities%20in%20
Comment%20Process_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GPG-JHGF].
19 Id.
20 Letter from Orice Williams Brown, GAO, to Representative Frank Pallone (Jan. 9, 2018)
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/
documents/Pallone_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6AQ-BLNT].
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also seeking an investigation.21 There has been no formal response. And
multiple members of Congress wrote to FCC Chairman Ajit Pai
requesting a delay in the rulemaking. The FCC declined to slow things
down. In the preamble to the final Order, and then in a series of ex-post
letters to individual Members from Chairman Pai, it argued that the
automated and phony comments did not undermine the process in any
way and so there was no justification for delay.
On the Senate side, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
launched an investigation, leading to a staff report22 and a hearing.23 The
thrust of the report is that agencies must be far more vigilant and
aggressive in ensuring that rulemaking documents contain real
comments from real people, free of profanity or private information.
Meanwhile, agencies were and are considering how they can protect
their dockets from phony comments. In March 2018, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a Request for Information
21 Pallone wrote in June 2017 and again in early 2018. Letter from Representative Frank
Pallone et al. to Jefferson Sessions, Att’y Gen., and Christopher Wray, Dir. of the FBI (Jan. 24,
2018),
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/
documents/DOJ.FBI_.2018.01.24.%20Letter%20on%20Fake%20Agency%20Comments.%20
DCCP.CAT_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AE9-GKZZ]. The letter states:

The practice of manipulating agency actions by flooding rulemaking dockets with fake
comments is far more widespread than it appeared when you were initially asked to
investigate. Some Americans’ voices are being co-opted in what appears to be a
systemic attempt to corrupt federal policy-making.
Immediate action is needed in order to restore public trust in the federal rulemaking
process. We urge you to use the full investigative powers of the FBI and DOJ to
promptly uncover who is behind this conduct and prosecute the parties under
applicable federal law.
22 UNITED STATES SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, ABUSES OF THE
FEDERAL
NOTICE-AND-COMMENT
RULEMAKING
PROCESS
3
(2019)
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-10-24%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20%20Abuses%20of%20the%20Federal%20Notice-and-Comment%20Rulemaking%20Process.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83A5-YDZC]. The Report catalogues a range of related concerns with
contemporary commenting, including mass comments, the use of profanity in comments,
publication of information that is private, copyrighted, or trade secrets, and malattributed
submissions.
23 Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems, Joint Hearing Before Perm. Subcomm. on
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, 116th Cong.
(2019), recording and transcript available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG116shrg38895/pdf/CHRG-116shrg38895.pdf [https://perma.cc/39C6-62ZP].
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regarding many aspects of its rulemaking process; one specific item on
which it sought feedback was the “processing and posting of comments
received
to
its
electronic
docket
on
regulations.gov,
including . . . treatment of anonymous comments [and] treatment of
comments where there may be questions about the commenter’s
identity.”24 Of the 152 comments received, almost none addressed this
issue. A single submission—from the Consumer Bankers Association—
referred to “media accounts [that] have reported disturbing abuses of the
comment process in an attempt to controvert the federal rulemaking
process.”25 I have no idea what it means to “controvert” the rulemaking
process, but it sounds bad. (It is possible that the Association meant
“subvert,” which is also bad.)26 It urged the CFPB to require commenters
to register, to post only authenticated comments, and to prohibit
anonymous comments, because “the benefits of providing an
unmoderated forum are outweighed by the risks posed by fraudulent
letters.”27
Despite this upset, those voicing concerns never really articulate why
they are so concerned. The Consumer Bankers Association refers to “the
risks posed by fraudulent letters” but never reveals what those risks are.
They are assumed to be self-evident. But it is impossible to determine
whether particular kinds of comments undermine the process, or how
much effort is worth expending in fighting them, without first
understanding the nature and extent of the harm they cause. And to do
that, it is necessary to have some theory of the purposes of notice and
comment. Much (not all) of the perceived harm from “fraudulent

24 Request for Information Regarding Bureau Rulemaking Processes, 83 Fed. Reg. 10437,
10440 (Mar. 9, 2018).
25 Dong Hong, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, Comment, Docket No. CFPB-2018-0009-0079,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2018-0009-0079
[https://perma.cc/53DW3MJK].
26 In a letter to the FCC, Senator Richard Blumenthal and two colleagues referred to
“concerns that the rule-making process was subverted by fraudulent comments and manipulated
by special interests.” Letter from Sens. Richard Blumenthal, Brian Schatz, & Edward Markey, to
David Hunt, FCC Inspector General (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/2018.10.29%20-%20FCC%20-%20Fake%20Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/49EM8VFG].
27 Hong, supra note 25. It is surely not a coincidence that such rules could meaningfully
discourage individual and small business commenters but would have no impact on trade groups
such as, for example, the Consumer Bankers Association.
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comments” comes from a misunderstanding of the notice-and-comment
process. If this were an election, we should be horrified at this corrupting
and devastating stuffing of the ballot box. If this were someone’s bank
account, we should be horrified at the outright theft by the imposter (and
the person whose identity was used would suffer a very tangible harm). If
this were a visible public forum, then there might be some reputational
harm to the impostee (if there is such a word). If the contents of the
comments were problematic and being read by and influencing large
swathes of the public, or impressionable children, or scientists (political
or other) gathering data, we might be worried about the pollution of
important information streams. But notice-and-comment rulemaking is
none of those things.
The following sections consider how under a proper understanding
of the process the harms from so-called fraudulent comments are quite
dilute.
II.

TERMINOLOGY

First, the matter of terminology. What should we call a comment
filed under the name of someone who did not in fact prepare, approve, or
submit it? The most common term is “fraudulent comment.”28 But this
states a legal conclusion, a conclusion that, as I discuss below, is
misplaced. The term is just inaccurate. It is also overbroad: a comment
might be “fraudulent” in the sense of misleading or dishonest in lots of
ways besides being submitted under a bogus name—most obviously, by
making false assertions or relying on invented data. That is also a
potential problem, but it is not the problem this Article (or the firestorm
over the FCC rulemaking) is about.
An alternative is “fake comment.”29 But this too is inaccurate. These
submissions do have something fake about them, but they are not fake

28 See, e.g., Mass, Computer-Generated, and Fraudulent Comments, Administrative
Conference of the United States, https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/mass-computergenerated-and-fraudulent-comments [https://perma.cc/8KBA-7UUL].
29 See, e.g., Fake Comments, supra note 13; Kevin Collier & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Millions of
Comments About the FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules Were Fake. Now the Feds Are Investigating,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 8, 2018, 1:20 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kevincollier/
feds-investigation-net-neutrality-comments [https://perma.cc/T53C-FSZA].
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comments; they are undeniably actual, real comments. They respond to a
rulemaking proposal; they are submitted to the rulemaking docket; they
state a view and/or contribute some information; there is no reason to
think that that view is anything other than the view of the person who is
actually submitting the comment. A “fake comment” might be something
that is not actually a comment—say someone sent a chocolate bar to the
agency for submission to the docket, labeling it a “comment.” Or it might
be disingenuous; an intentionally silly or ineffective or self-defeating
comment that argued against the actual position of the submitter so
ineffectively as to undermine the position it purported to take. That could
be a “fake” comment. But these are actual comments, supporting the
positions favored by the submitter.
“Pseudonymous comment” captures the essential fact that the
problem is that the stated name of the submitter is not the actual name of
the submitter. But it is overbroad; only a subset of pseudonymous
comments is potentially problematic. The Internet is full of
pseudonymous activity; users have screen names, avatars, aliases. Much
of that activity is benign if not valuable; using a pseudonym is not
necessarily misleading and often drives or enables valuable activity.
Someone using a pseudonym can have a distinct, known, and identifiable
voice and produce work of astonishing value. Think of Publius or George
Eliot.
Another possibility is “fabricated comments.”30 This is closer. That
captures an essential point—that there is something phony or
manufactured about the comments—without overstating the point or
asserting a legal conclusion. But it too is overbroad for our purposes.
Comments can be fabricated in many ways; the term would also serve as
a (tendentious and pejorative) label for mass comment campaigns, for
Astroturf comment campaigns, and for computer-generated anonymous
comments.31

30 See, e.g., Fake It Till They Make It: How Bad Actors Use Astroturfing to Manipulate
Regulators, Disenfranchise Consumers and Subvert the Rulemaking Process, Hearing Before the
Oversight & Investigations Subcomm. of the House Committee on Financial Services, 116th Cong.
(Feb. 6, 2020) (prepared statement of Bartlett Collins Naylor, Public Citizen).
31 These are related but distinct phenomena. A mass comment campaign involves a single
organizing entity, often an NGO or other membership organization, urging its members or
supporters to submit comments and, often, making it easy to do so by providing a prepared text
and a hyperlink to the rulemaking docket. The result is generally multiple, sometimes tens of
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Cary Coglienese has suggested the term “inauthentic comments.”32
That strikes my ear as better than “fabricated” but suffering from the same
shortcoming; moreover, “inauthentic,” like “fake,” implies that the
submission is not really a comment when in fact it is intended to influence
public policy and there will be people who agree with its substance.
“Misattributed” is more promising. It highlights the particular
problem: the commenter is attributing the comment to a person who did
not write or submit it. It is a little anodyne; it also does not fit exactly
because “misattribution” can be in good faith and is generally not done
by the author. Still, I was going to go with that until Cynthia Farina
suggested “malattributed.”33 The fact that “malattributed” is not actually
a word in the English language undeniably counts against it. But the
neologism has compensating benefits. Resonating with “malware” (and
possibly “maladministration”)34 it communicates the submitter’s bad

thousands, of essentially identical submissions. See Cynthia R. Farina, Paul Miller, Mary J.
Newhart, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley, Rebecca Vernon, & Cornell eRulemaking Initiative,
Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking,
31 PACE L. REV. 382, 416 (2011). Astroturfing, a term generally attributed to Texas Senator Lloyd
Bentsen, refers to an orchestrated effort, often bought and paid for, designed to look like it arose
spontaneously from the grass roots. See John McNutt & Katherine Boland, Astroturf, Technology
and the Future of Community Mobilization: Implications for Nonprofit Theory, 34 J. SOC. & SOC.
WELFARE 165, 167 (2007) (“[Astroturf efforts] create the impression that local people are engaged
in the effort and doing the things that traditional community organizations do.”). Computergenerated comments are exactly that; multiple individual submissions that are not in fact from
individual submitters but instead from a single computer source or bot. Each of these is
potentially problematic, and the categories can merge and overlap, but none involves the key
characteristic that is the focus of this article: submitting a comment that purports to be from
someone who has nothing to do with it.
32 Cary Coglienese, Remarks at the Administrative Conference of the United States and
Administrative Law Review Symposium: Mass and Fake Comments in Agency Rulemaking 106
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/10-5-18%20Mass%20
and%20Fake%20Comments%20in%20Agency%20Rulemaking%20Transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VFP3-264D].
33 Email from Cynthia Farina to Michael Herz (Aug. 8, 2020) (on file with author).
34 At the Constitutional Convention, George Mason proposed “maladministration” as the
ground for impeachment of the President. James Madison objected that that term covered too
much conduct that did not justify removal from office, at which point Mason abandoned
“maladministration” and proposed “high crimes and misdemeanors.” 1 MAX FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (rev. ed. 1937). My view of
“malattributed comments” is similar, mutatis mutandis. They are to be regretted but are not so
serious as to justify a ferocious response, being well shy of high crimes and misdemeanors.

HERZ.42.1.1 (Do Not Delete)

2020]

1/13/21 10:43 AM

MALATTRIBUTED COMMENTS

13

intent while still focusing on the specific problem. So unless and until
someone comes up with something better, that is the term I shall use.
III.

IT’S NOT A VOTE!

In 2016, the Russian government and its agents engaged in a stealth
disinformation campaign through social media in an effort to swing the
presidential election.35 For example, they created phony Facebook groups
and pages focused on hot-button, divisive issues and purchased
thousands of Facebook ads, put up event pages to encourage attendance
at anti-immigrant rallies, and spread false stories of voter fraud.36 Similar
efforts were undertaken on Instagram. The key player here was the
Internet Research Agency (IRA), a private company of “professional
trolls”37 linked to the Russian government. IRA Facebook posts reached
140 million users.38 According to the Special Counsel’s February 2018
indictment of the IRA and others, the agency “registered and controlled
hundreds of web-based email accounts hosted by U.S. email providers
under false names so as to appear to be U.S. persons and groups.”39
These efforts caused justifiable anger and dismay. They almost
certainly involved federal criminal violations. They had the potential of

Useful overviews include P.W. SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKEWAR: THE
WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2018).
36 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND
UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 87–89, 175–78 (2018).
37 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS 4 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y96-54XA].
38 Jonathan Masters, Russia, Trump, and the 2016 U.S. Election, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Feb.
26,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election
[https://perma.cc/98G7-AVEM].
39 Indictment ¶ 40, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. Feb 16, 2018). The indictment named the IRA, two other organizations, and thirteen
Russian individuals as defendants. The prosecution has completely stalled. The individual
defendants and the IRA have not responded, and remain, unreachable in Russia. The two other
defendants unsuccessfully sought to dismiss the indictment, and aggressively sought sensitive
information in discovery, leading the prosecution to move to dismiss the charges. Katie Benner
& Sharon LaFraniere, Justice Dept. Moves to Drop Charges Against Russian Firms Filed by
Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/us/politics/concordcase-russian-interference.html [https://perma.cc/M8U4-8UMT].
35
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causing, and may well have caused, real harm by interfering with the
legitimate electoral process.
Reports of Russian interference first surfaced in the summer of 2016,
with news stories concerning the hacking of Democratic National
Committee emails. In September, Democrats Dianne Feinstein and
Adam Schiff, the ranking members of the Senate and House Intelligence
Committees, issued a joint statement saying that they believed that
Russian intelligence agencies were carrying out a plan to interfere with
the election.40 After the November election, press coverage began to cover
the social media efforts, which were a major focus of press coverage
throughout 2017.
Russian efforts to sway the 2016 election through manipulation of
social media and bogus accounts are only the most visible of a raft of
similar efforts that amount to “war by other memes.”41 One of the most
disorienting and frightening aspects of our age is the frequency and
effectiveness with which anonymous or pseudonymous social media
accounts are used to spread disinformation.42
This is the background to the Wall Street Journal article about the
net neutrality rulemaking. Read against a drumbeat of stories about
Russian election hacking, a flood of computer-generated comments feels
like more of the same. All the more so because Russian bots were the
source of some of the phony comments.43 Indeed, FCC Commissioner

40 Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein, Schiff Statement on Russian Hacking (Sep. 22,
2016), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/9/feinstein-schiff-statement-onrussian-hacking [https://perma.cc/S3QJ-PQDX].
41 SINGER & BROOKING, supra note 35, at 17.

See generally id.; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36.
James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Millions of People Post Comments on Federal
Regulations. Many Are Fake., WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/millionsof-people-post-comments-on-federal-regulations-many-are-fake-1513099188
[https://perma.cc/32ZP-JKFL] (quoting FCC spokesman Brian Hart as stating that over 400,000
comments in favor of the old rules came “from the same address in Russia”); Hamza Shaban,
FCC Commissioner, NY Attorney General Call for Delay of Net Neutrality Vote Over Fake
Comments, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2017/12/04/fcc-commissioner-new-york-attorney-general-call-for-delay-of-netneutrality-vote-over-fake-comments [https://perma.cc/ZGG5-3UXL].
42
43
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Jessica Rosenworcel made the link explicit in a Washington Post op-ed
entitled “Russians Are Hacking Our Public-Commenting System, Too.”44
However, the two settings are just not the same. The net neutrality
rulemaking, like all rulemakings, was not an election. Had it been, then
the phony comments would have been outrageous. Indeed, they would
have been worse than the election interference. That was designed to
influence voters; here, the phony comments were actual “votes.” It would
be election fraud on an unprecedented scale, millions of false votes. And
false votes are problematic because they carry exactly the same weight as
valid votes. Stuffing ballot boxes produces outcomes that are indisputably
wrong and illegitimate because the right and legitimate outcome is
exclusively a function of the vote tally. One cannot evaluate the
correctness or legitimacy of the result of an election outcome except as a
function of (a) full and fair procedures allowing all eligible voters to
participate and (b) the final tally. The right outcome is the one a majority
of voters support. That is precisely why actual voter suppression and
actual voter fraud (if you can find it) must be taken seriously. Not
counting votes or counting the wrong votes produces, by definition, the
wrong outcome.45
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is a very different creature.
Comments are not votes. The “right” and “legitimate” outcome is a
function of the law, the facts, and reasoned decision-making. Duplicative
comments are not especially helpful. Not everyone needs to participate.
It is emphatically not a one-person, one-vote regime where all voices have
equal weight. Some comments are more influential than others for
entirely legitimate reasons—they are more complete, better-reasoned,
more on point, or from a submitter with especially useful knowledge.
Since rulemaking began to move online two decades ago, many,
including yours truly, have predicted, and lamented, that the result would

44 Jessica Rosenworcel, Russians Are Hacking Our Public-Commenting System, Too, WASH.
POST (March 6, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russians-arehacking-our-public-commenting-system-too/2018/03/06/fdfe3dae-1d6a-11e8-b2d908e748f892c0story.html [https://perma.cc/84FC-VDP2].
45 For a fuller, and more sophisticated, summary of electoral legitimacy, see James A.
Gardner, Democratic Legitimacy Under Conditions of Severely Depressed Voter Turnout, U. CHI.
L. REV. ONLINE (June 26, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/26/pandemicgardner/ [https://perma.cc/D6PS-F9FL].
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be a shift to a model of notice-and-comment as a referendum.46 For the
most part, that prediction has not come to pass. To be sure, lay
participants in notice-and-comment rulemaking tend to view it as a vote.
This is one of the basic findings of Cynthia Farina and her Regulation
Room colleagues. As they write:
Rulemaking 2.0 takes place at the intersection of two powerful cultural
patterns. The first is the popular equation in the United States of
democratic voice with casting a vote, or, it’s [sic] privatized equivalent,
responding to a poll. Because voting is how “public participation” is
culturally constructed, site visitors already “know” how the public
provides input in government decision-making. Everyone
“understands” that the side with the most votes wins. The second
pattern is from online culture: Voting is how the Web works. Ranking
or rating—by assigning stars, sliding a bar, or simply clicking “Like”
or “Recommend”—is a staple of Web 2.0 interactivity. Like the
gladiators of ancient Rome, web content lives or dies by whether the
crowd gives thumbs up, or down. The confluence of these two patterns
may create such a powerful “voting instinct” that the presence of even
fairly modest preference-aggregation devices causes users to ignore
other signals that they really ought to learn more about how
rulemaking works.47

The powerful impulse to view notice-and-comment as a vote is
reinforced by many mass comment campaigns. Repeatedly, those
encouraging others to submit comments stress the need to show
“support” for agency proposals they like or “opposition” to those they do
not. Sometimes, the pitch is franker: “Whoever gets the most letters in
wins.”48 Similarly, news accounts frequently emphasize how many

46 See Michael Herz, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY PRACTICE 2002–2003, at 148–49 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2004).
47 Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley, & Cornell eRulemaking
Initiative, Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 431–32 (2011) (citations omitted).
48 Holly Turner, SEC Proxy Firm Rule at 4:42, YOUTUBE (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_zLAvx5JAZk&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/5GV7J8NX]. This video is controversial. See, e.g., Republican Operative Holly Turner Posts Appallingly
Deceptive Video in Support of Anti-Shareholder Proposal from the SEC, VALUEEDGE BLOG (Jan.
10, 2020), https://valueedgeadvisors.com/2020/01/10/republican-operative-holly-turner-postsappallingly-deceptive-video-in-support-of-anti-shareholder-proposal-from-the-sec
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comments support or oppose a proposal.49 But in the eyes of the
agencies,50 the courts,51 and commentators, notice-and-comment is not a

[https://perma.cc/27GW-GJBN]. As of September 29, 2020, it had fifteen thumbs down and
fourteen thumbs up, which is encouraging in a glass-half-full kind of way.
49 See, e.g., Jeff St. John, Edison Electric Institute Declines to Support Petition Seeking Federal
Overturn of Net Metering, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 4, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/edison-electric-institute-wont-endorse-petition-seeking-federal-overturn-of-netmetering [https://perma.cc/2BPC-84WD] (reporting, in a section of the article headed “No
public support for NERA’s anti-solar petition,” that “[a]s of Thursday, no comments supporting
NERA’s petition had been filed in FERC’s proceeding. But the docket is filled with comments
opposing its legal argument”).
50 REGULATIONS.GOV,
TIPS
FOR
SUBMITTING
EFFECTIVE
COMMENTS
2,
http://www.regulations.gov/docs/Tips_For_Submitting_Effective_Comments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XZL9-KB4P] (“The comment process is not a vote. The government is
attempting to formulate the best policy, so when crafting a comment it is important that you
adequately explain the reasoning behind your position.”); see also id. at 3 (“Many in the public
mistakenly believe that their submitted form letter constitutes a ‘vote’ regarding the issues
concerning them. Although public support or opposition may help guide important public
policies, agencies make determinations for a proposed action based on sound reasoning and
scientific evidence rather than a majority of votes. A single, well supported comment may carry
more weight than a thousand form letters.”); Dylan Brown, Fake Comments vs. Form Letters in
Pebble Fight, GREENWIRE (June 13, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/
1060571783 (reporting on pseudonymous comments, many ad hominem and abusive, filed by
project supporters to counter-balance environmentalist mass comment campaigns and quoting
agency official as saying that “‘substantive’ comments are the only ones that matter anyway. ‘It’s
really not like a vote.’”).
51 See, e.g., Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 702 F.3d 1156,
1181 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e consider the substance of the comments, not the number for or
against the project.”); Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“The
purpose of a rulemaking proceeding is not merely to vote up or down the specific proposals
advanced before the proceeding begins, but to refine, modify, and supplement the proposals in
the light of evidence and arguments presented in the course of the proceeding.”); U.S. Cellular
Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the agency “has no obligation to take
the approach advocated by the largest number of commenters; indeed, the Commission may
adopt a course endorsed by no commenter” (citations omitted)); NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104,
122 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The substantial-evidence standard has never been taken to mean that
an agency rulemaking is a democratic process by which the majority of commenters prevail by
sheer weight of numbers. Regardless of majority sentiment within the community of
commenters, the issue is whether the rules are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The number and length of comments, without more, is not germane to a court’s substantialevidence inquiry.” (citations omitted)). Arguably, the strongest indicators that courts do not view
notice-and-comment rulemaking as a referendum are what they have not said and arguments
that litigants have not made. Agencies frequently reach a conclusion that runs counter to the
majority sentiment of commenters. But those challenging the rule never argue that this fact
means the rule is invalid. No one would think that is a winning argument. And because the
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vote, a referendum, or a plebiscite. As Jennifer Nou has summed it up:
“[A]gencies can’t promulgate regulations by reference to how loudly the
crowd applauds. They need evidence and facts.”52
One silver lining of the net neutrality contretemps is that it reminds
us of one reason (among several) why notice-and-comment should not
be understood as a vote: it is a terrible way to aggregate preferences since
it is utterly unrepresentative, non-random, and subject to manipulation.53
If comments were votes, we would be in deep trouble even if the problem
of bot-generated and malattributed comments was completely solved. In
other words, even if it made sense for agencies to defer to, or consider,
public sentiment, counting comments is not the way to do it. It is the
exact opposite of something like deliberative polling, lacking the two
essential features of that method: a random selection of participants and
a process of education and discussion to insure informed votes.54 If
deliberative polling is the gold standard,55 notice-and-comment
argument is not made, courts are never called upon to reject it. This is true even in extreme cases.
For example, in 2003 the FCC adopted new rules about concentrated media ownership. Public
comment on the proposal ran overwhelmingly against the proposal; approximately 99.9% of the
almost two million comments were opposed. But the agency sided with the .1%. See Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620 (2003). See generally Mary M.
Underwood, Comment, On Media Consolidation, the Public Interest, and Notice and Agency
Consideration of Comments, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 185 (2008). In the ensuing court challenge, the
court did mention that it was “notabl[e]” that “nearly two million people weighed in by letters,
postcards, e-mails, and petitions to oppose further relaxation of the rules.” Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004). But it did not deem that fact legally relevant and
nothing in its review turned on the number or one-sidedness of the comments.
52 Jennifer Nou, The FCC Just Received a Million Net-Neutrality Comments. Here’s What It’s
Like to Sort Through Them All, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/18/the-fcc-just-received-amillion-net-neutrality-comments-heres-what-its-like-to-sort-through-them-all
[https://perma.cc/M5XZ-674P].
53 This irrefutable point is effectively made by, among others, Cynthia R. Farina, Mary
Newhart, & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation
That Counts, 2 MICH. J ENVTL. ADMIN. L. 123, 142–45 (2012).
54 See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009); James S. Fishkin, Consulting the Public through Deliberative
Polling, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 128 (2003).
55 Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Polling as the Gold Standard, 19 GOOD SOC’Y 55, 55 (2010)
(“The Deliberative Polls of James Fishkin and Robert Luskin represent today the gold standard
of attempts to sample what a considered public opinion might be on issues of political
importance.”).
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rulemaking is the lead, or plastic, or thin-air standard. Even if we could
ensure that every comment came from a real, single, unique submitter,
there is no reason to think that the sum of yeas and nays would reflect
overall public opinion.
It is easy to fake a vote; it is impossible to fake a useful comment.
Sure, a comment that contained made-up data would look useful and turn
out not to be. But the point is that the value of a comment turns on its
content. That value can range from zero (useless) to, say, one hundred
(fantastic). The value of a vote turns on its source; that value is either zero
or one hundred. As long as agencies focus on the content of comments
rather than their source or their numbers, malattributed comments are
an annoyance but not delegitimizing.56
In sum, most objections to malattributed comments rest, implicitly
or explicitly, on the misconception that notice-and-comment rulemaking
is a referendum.57 For that reason, they are misplaced.
IV.

SO WHAT IS THE HARM FROM MALATTRIBUTED COMMENTS?

The previous Section argued that viewing malattributed comments
as per se problematic or delegitimizing rests on a category mistake. Once
comments are understood as inputs in a deliberative, reasoned process
rather than a vote, the problem becomes more dilute and harder to

56 In the words of one long-time, highly respected Department of Transportation attorney,
Neil Eisner, who was defending anonymous rather than pseudonymous comments, a “comment
should be judged on its merits rather than the name [of the submitter]. If anonymous, I may not
give it the same consideration as I would to a known expert, but if they are correct in their point
and provide proof that our proposal would cause harm,” it should not be ignored just because it
is anonymous. Comment of Neil Eisner, AUCS Committee on Regulation (April 25, 2011),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/COR-2d-Mtg-Eisner-Comment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BDN-LS4C].
57 See, e.g., Karl Bode, The FCC Insists it Can’t Stop Impostors From Lying About My Views
On Net Neutrality, TECHDIRT (July 11, 2017, 3:23 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20170710/10071737756/fcc-insists-it-cant-stop-impostors-lying-about-my-views-netneutrality.shtml [https://perma.cc/AS3F-B8D7] (expressing dismay that the FCC is “doing
nothing about the pile of bogus comments (some of which originate from dead people) spoiling
what should be a simple democratic exercise”); id. (comment of “Anonymous Coward” July 11,
2017 4:21 PM) (“One person/group of people using others’ identity without permission to say
something on their behalf is absolutely a violation of the democratic principle as that person is
over-representing his/herself.”).
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identify with particularity. Vague assertions that the process has been
“tainted”58 or “corrupted,”59 or lacks “integrity,”60 sound troublesome but
are exceedingly imprecise. This Part attempts to pin down the harms.
Section A discusses the possibility that such comments lead to bad
regulatory outcomes; this would be a serious negative consequence but
seems unlikely to happen. The remaining subsections touch on harms
that seem more real; though not trivial, they are still rather modest.
One point at the outset. There is nothing good about malattribution.
Whatever value a malattributed comment may have as a comment would
still exist were it submitted anonymously or under an accurate identity.
Thus, there is no benefit to offset whatever harm they cause. They do
cause some harm, and accordingly some efforts should be made to
control and contain them. But we cannot assess how extensive such
efforts should be without a real grasp of the actual harms. Moreover,
unless we are very clear-eyed about costs and benefits, efforts to prevent
or neutralize these harms may have unintended negative consequences
that match or exceed those of inauthentic comments.
A.

Bad Regulatory Outcomes

The quality of an agency regulation depends on the agency both
having the information it needs and not getting misled or distracted by
information that is irrelevant or false. Notice-and-comment rulemaking
is a deliberative policymaking process where the agency relies on
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, New York Times Co. v. FCC,
No. 1:18-cv-08607-LGS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019), 2019 WL 3991285 (stating that “the public
comment process in the net neutrality rulemaking was tainted by fraud”).
59 Brian Fung, FCC Net Neutrality Process ‘Corrupted’ by Fake Comments and Vanishing
Consumer Complaints, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017, 1:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/24/fcc-net-neutrality-processcorrupted-by-fake-comments-and-vanishing-consumer-complaints-officials-say
[https://perma.cc/STV5-FZB7].
60 Cheryl Bolen, Are You Real? U.S. Hunts Fakers Among 10,000 Commenters on Rules,
BLOOMBERG GOV’T (June 20, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://about.bgov.com/news/are-you-real-u-shunts-fakers-among-10000-commenters-on-rules [https://perma.cc/9U4J-E7HG] (“While
agencies take any fraud seriously, public comments aren’t the equivalent of votes for a rule, so
the effect of comments with false identities on a regulation is minimal. Still, Democratic
lawmakers say any use of false identities can taint the integrity of rulemaking.”).
58
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commenters to provide information. If the agency is misled or
misinformed, the result will be a suboptimal regulation. The question is
whether malattributed comments pose a significant risk of having such
destructive influence.61 The series of Wall Street Journal articles
highlighting the net neutrality fiasco was entitled Hidden Influence.62
That certainly flags the core concern—phony comments are influencing
policy, and policy based on falsehoods is bound to be bad policy. Well,
are malattributed comments influential? And if so, is the use of false
names what makes them so?
The answer should be no. First, if the fear is that the agency will
misapprehend the level of support for one position or another,63 that
error (a) is not relevant, as discussed above, (b) for that reason is unlikely
to affect the agency decision even if it did mislead, because the agency
should not, and generally is not, interested in counting heads, (c) has
nothing to do with the use of other people’s names; the same result could
occur with a raft of computer-generated anonymous filings, and (d) is
unlikely to happen at all, since agencies will be unlikely to view comments
as meaningful indicators of the level of public support.

61 In arguing for the release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of information
regarding the source of computer-generated malattributed comments, the New York Times took
exactly this view of the harm from malattributed comments:

The public interest in getting and analyzing the contents of the API proxy server logs
is considerable. Among other things, the logs will likely reveal the true extent of the
fraud that infected the net neutrality rulemaking, including the extent to which cloudbased automated bots intervened in an important public debate. In the wake of Special
Counsel’s Robert Mueller’s recent indictment of 13 Russian individuals and three
Russian companies for interfering with U.S. elections and the U.S. political system, the
public interest in understanding how these cloud-based automated bots are being used
to influence an array of U.S. political activities—including the agency notice-andcomment process—is exceptionally high . . . Put simply, the data can tell us who
corrupted the notice-and comment process, and how they did it.
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 58, at 16; see also Prechtel
v. FCC, 330 F. Supp.3d 320, 331 (D.D.C. 2018) (stressing public interest in clarifying whether
“the Commission succeeded—as it assured the American people it had—in managing a publiccommenting process seemingly corrupted by dubious comments”).
62 See Grimaldi & Overburg, supra note 7.
63 See, e.g., Katherine Krems, Crowdsourcing, Kind Of, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 63, 76 (2018)
(“[T]he FCC will not be able to properly gauge public sentiment without a record that actually
reflects public sentiment.”).
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Ultimately, this is an empirical question; it is not enough to say that
the answer “should be” no. To my knowledge, no one has done the
necessary work to determine whether mass, bot-generated, or
malattributed comments have been influential. My sense is that they are
not at the career level. Career rule-writers view their broad job as
developing sound policy and their narrow job as responding to
substantively important comments. Comments that do not require a
response are ignored. But that may not be true of political appointees,
who may be looking for confirmation or selling points. Political
appointees, and the White House, care about public approval and how a
proposal plays. They may be nervous about a large-scale negative
response and reassured and emboldened by large-scale support. They also
may be less focused on technical details, the quality of supporting data,
and legal constraints that preoccupy career rule writers, which leaves
more room for vote counting.
Nonetheless, the risk here seems relatively low. The most likely
scenario is that an agency will latch on to apparent but bogus support to
justify something it would do anyway; it is an ex post justification but not
an actual cause of the decision. Moreover, if this occurs, it is not a
problem with malattributed comments per se; it is a problem with any
computer-generated comments and indeed any comments submitted
pursuant to an organized campaign. Also, even if the comments are
influential the ultimate decision must still be justified as reasoned
decision-making; the agency rule will be set aside if all the agency can say
in its defense is that lots of commenters were supportive. Finally, just the
opposite phenomenon is also possible. That is, the agency may react
negatively to being swamped by repetitive submissions of dubious
pedigree and, as a result, discount the comments and move away from
the position they advocate. There is some empirical support for this
supposition.64
Second, mass and malattributed comments tend to contain very
little information, generally repeating what a known person has said or
stating a bottom-line preference for a particular outcome. Thus, there is
nothing in the typical malattributed comment that will be influential. One
thing that in most circumstances will not be influential is the use of a
64 Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably Won’t) Change Everything, 1
ISJLP 111, 138–39 (2005).
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random person’s name and address, whether that person is the actual
sender of the comment or not.
Third, someone believes the comment, that is why it is being
submitted. It is a real comment, submitted by someone who wants the
agency to act in accordance with the comment. So its content is not the
problem. To the extent it says something of substance, there is no reason
not to consider what it says. Put differently, not only will the comment
likely not have any influence, any influence it does have is unlikely to be
untoward.
Focus on malattribution in particular. That is a false piece of
information being communicated to the agency. Is it a cause for concern
in the sense that it might affect the outcome for the worse? It is hard to
see how.
Use of false names on duplicative comments is potentially
misleading in two possible ways. First, it is possible that a single entity or
person submits multiple comments under multiple names. There is only
one entity or person behind the multiple comments, but it looks like there
are many. So what is misleading is not the content of the comments but
their apparent number. If numbers count, that could be important. If
numbers are irrelevant, then this is just not misleading in a relevant,
meaningful, or, to use the legal term, material way.
Second, the names themselves are false and therefore potentially
misleading. Not very, though. The malattributions that often grab
observers’ attention involve using the name of a famous (sometimes
dead) person. But these are not misleading; anyone would realize that the
name is false. For example, in the net neutrality rulemaking, there were
multiple submissions from “Barack Obama” and from “Ajit Pai.”65 This
is not deceptive; no rulemaking official would think that the former
President or the FCC Chair had submitted the comment. Ditto for
submissions from “Elvis Presley.”
Even if the phony name is not a household name but a big shot in
the relevant field—say a professor, consultant, or lobbyist—it is highly

65 See, e.g., “Barack Obama,” ID 1051157755251, FCC Proceeding 17-108 (May 11, 2017),
https://ww.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/1051157755251 [https://perma.cc/8DVS-QESE] (submission from
“Barack Obama” of “1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC,” objecting to the
“unprecedented regulatory power the Obama Administration imposed on the internet” and
“Obama’s . . . power grab”).
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unlikely that the ruse would work. If the name is on one of among
thousands of duplicative comments, it likely will not even be noticed. If it
is noticed, the effect will be minimal because even experts do not
influence rule writers by merely expressing an outcome preference. On
the other hand, if the comment is unique and substantive the name will
be noticed but the deception will likely be apparent. If it is not, the
potential problem is not with the false name but with false content (if
any). This question of unreliable content exists wholly separate from the
malattribution phenomenon, and the agency always has some obligation
to double-check information and data on which it is actually relying. And,
last, if the name given is unknown, then it is not misleading because the
name carries no significance. The submitter’s name in itself does not go
to the weight of the comment. The comment is not more powerful if
signed by David Jones, whoever that is, than if it is signed by William
Smith, whoever that is.
To illustrate the foregoing, consider the comment from an
individual set out in the footnote.66 This was submitted in a Federal

I am writing to endorse the comments submitted to Docket # FHWA-2013-0020 by
the League of American Bicyclists.

66

I believe that performance measures on our transportation system should include
measures that reflect all users—including bicyclists and pedestrians. Specifically I’d
like to comment on three of the performance measures in this rule.
National Highway System (NHS) Performance
In the FAST Act, Congress made clear that states must consider all modes and users
in the building and reconstruction of NHS projects. However, this rule proposes to
measure reliability of the system by travel time for motor vehicles ONLY.
The reliability of the NHS must include a measure for ALL users. For bicyclists and
pedestrians reliability should be measured by safe access on NHS roads.
Congestion Mitigation
The rule proposes that congestion mitigation be measured by delay for drivers. It fails
to measure people not adding to that congestion because they are biking, walking or
taking transit.
Many states and metropolitan areas have goals to reduce congestion by reducing
vehicle miles traveled and/or to increase mode share for bicycling, walking and transit
use. To make this rule more compatible with these goals, a new measure should be
added to account for people traveling by modes that reduce congestion: transit,
bicycling and walking.
Mobile Source Emissions
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Highway Administration rulemaking regarding standards for measuring
state progress toward achieving federal transportation goals. It is
intelligent, substantive, and informed, if somewhat unelaborated and
stronger on the what than the how or the why. The issues raised would
merit a discussion in the preamble to the final rule (and received it).67.
But there are two characteristics of this comment that might be relevant
to its evaluation and consideration. First, it is one of 5,858 identical
comments (out of about 8,000 total comments). Evidently it was drafted
by the League of American Bicyclists, 6,000 of whose members submitted
the suggested text or something almost identical to it. How 6,000 identical
comments differ from a single comment with the same text, if at all, is the
issue of mass comments, outside the scope of this article.
Second, this particular comment was submitted by Elvis Presley.68
How to explain that? One possibility is that The King is in fact still alive
and—who knew?—really interested in promoting bicycling. Possible, but
unlikely. Another is that somewhere in America there is a person who has
that name but is not the Elvis Presley, and he is very interested in
promoting bicycling. And the third is that someone not named Elvis
Presley, but interested in promoting bicycling, wanted to comment
without giving his name and so used a pseudonym. The point is that it
does not matter which of these three things is true. The value of the
comment depends entirely on its content, not the “from” line of the email.
What might affect the weight of the comment is the biography of the
commenter. Is it someone with particular expertise? With “situated

I support the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions both from tailpipes and from
construction of new projects. The transportation system is responsible for 23 percent
of the country’s emissions, and in order to meet the goals and commitments made at
the Paris COP we need to start measuring and reducing emissions.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the rule, and support the move to a
performance-based transportation system.
I hope the final performance measures will reflect the Secretary’s leadership to serve
all users of the transportation system.
Federal Highway Administration, National Performance Management Measures, 82 Fed.
Reg. 5970, 5981 (Feb. 17, 2017).
68 Federal Highway Administration, National Performance Management Measures, Docket
#FHWA-2013-0054, Comment from Elvis Presley (posted Aug. 29, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document? D=FHWA-2013-0054-6039 [https://perma.cc/V7UY-YSA2].
67
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knowledge”?69 Who has done relevant research or had direct personal
experience? Who will be directly regulated or affected? All those people
possess information that members of the general public do not and that
the agency should know. They may also have a stake that should counsel
caution in taking their assertions at face value. For both reasons, it is
useful to know who the source of the comment is. But biographical
misrepresentations are part of a larger and distinct problem not specific
to “fraudulent” comments, that of the accuracy, completeness, or
representativeness of assertions within comments. If an agency relies on
crummy information, it will write crummy rules. At best, crummy
information in comments is a distraction, requiring time and effort to
debunk before being ignored. However, the system works pretty well to
deal with that problem. Agencies have expertise. They receive other
comments.70 And at least so far, malattributed comments are not
crammed with false information because they are not crammed with
information, full stop.
B.

Distraction and Inefficiency

A frequent assertion is that malattributed comments overwhelm the
system, distract agency attention, and can “shut out” other legitimate
voices that should be heard. FCC Commissioner Rosenworcel has made
this point repeatedly with regard to the net neutrality rulemaking. In her
view, “the public is increasingly shut out of decision-making by the fraud
that is flooding public channels for comment.”71 Others have made the
same argument.72 It is not exactly clear what the mechanism of shutting

69 See Cynthia R. Farina, Dmitry Epstein, Josiah Heidt, & Mary J. Newhart, Knowledge in the
People: Rethinking “Value” in Public Rulemaking Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185,
1187–88, 1197 (2012) (describing “situated knowledge” as “information about impacts,
ambiguities and gaps, enforceability, contributory causes, unintended consequences, etc. that is
known by participants because of their lived experience in the complex reality into which the
proposed regulation would be introduced”).
70 I suggest in Part VI below that one response to the problem of fraudulent comments would
be greater use of reply periods so as to crowdsource the scrutiny of submissions for information
quality problems.
71 Rosenworcel, supra note 44.
72 See, e.g., Krems, supra note 63, at 76 (noting that “false information . . . overshadows real
public comments that reflect public sentiment” and “illegitimate comments minimize the impact
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out is and Commissioner Rosenworcel does not provide details. She is on
the inside, and perhaps we should take her word for it. But there is reason
to be skeptical.
First, to the extent the volume of comments is a problem, it is not a
malattributed comments problem. Rather, it is what Livermore,
Eidelman, and Grom call a “haystack problem.”73 “The haystack problem
occurs when comments of high substantive value are hidden within a very
large set of documents of lower substantive value, creating the risk that
agencies will fail to locate and appropriately consider high-value
comments.”74 If a million people submit the same comment pursuant to
a mass comment campaign, deduplication software can easily identify
them and avoid swamping readers. But if a million people submit unique
comments, or if a bot produces a million comments that are sufficiently
distinct to get past the deduplication software, then readers will be
swamped.75 Yet that problem is not the result of, and exists in the absence
of, the use of phony identities. It will arise whether the comments have
false names attached to them or not.76
In any event, concerns over real voices being drowned out
misunderstands the nature and goals of the notice-and-comment process.
The misconception is common and fostered in part by government
agencies themselves. But misconception it is. The mistake is in thinking
that the point of the comment process is to “let every voice be heard.”77

of those that are legitimate”); id. at 82 (noting that “when fake comments dominate, legitimate
comments may be overlooked”).
73 Michael A. Livermore, Vladimir Eidelman & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted
Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1016–17 (2018).
74 Id. at 981.
75 Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 893, 899–901
(2011).
76 For a useful discussion of technical responses to the haystack problem and its counterpart,
the “forest problem,” i.e. the challenge of getting an overall perspective on the totality of
comments, see Livermore et al., supra note 73.
77 The front page of regulations.gov includes the subtitle “Your Voice in Federal
Decisionmaking” and invites users to “Make a Difference. Submit your comments and let your
voice be heard.” Make a difference. Submit your Comments and let your Voice be Heard,
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov [https://perma.cc/2SBN-C3XD]. Similarly,
when regulations.gov held a competition for short videos to promote the site, the winning
submission promises that the Internet makes it easier than ever to “let your voice be heard” and
concludes with three ordinary citizens each admonishing the viewer to “let your voice be heard.”
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One problem with conceiving this as the goal is that it is self-defeating.
The more successful agencies are in getting individuals to submit
comments in broadly consequential or controversial rulemakings, the less
any individual submitter’s “voice” will get through. This is a universal
truth about the Internet—everyone can speak, which means it is very hard
to be heard. As the editor-in-chief of the Huffington Post observed in
explaining the decision to shut down the publication’s longstanding
platform for unpaid, “citizen journalists,” unfiltered platforms devolve
into “cacophonous, messy, hard-to-hear places where voices get drowned
out and where the loudest shouting voice prevails.”78
More importantly, the goal is not to hear individual voices. Rather,
it is to ensure that the agency is fully informed. Repetitive comments are
not helpful; empty statements of a bottom-line are not helpful. Suppose
the Fish and Wildlife Service proposes to list a species as endangered. Say
(unrealistically) that it only gets one hundred comments. No problem of
swamping or drowning out here. Fifty of the comments are from experts
of one sort or another; fifty are from lay-persons who express a clear
view—some pro, some con—regarding the listing but do not include any
information or argument. When the final rule comes out, the preamble
will not mention or respond to those latter fifty comments because they
included nothing to respond to. Were the “voices” of those fifty “heard”?
Literally, yes. But they made no contribution to the rulemaking and had
no effect on its outcome. This was not because they were drowned out.
Ignoring empty and/or duplicative comments is not nefarious,
though it is sometimes perceived that way. The government analytics
firm FiscalNote has studied FCC rulemaking notices and created what it
calls a “gravitas score” to predict how much attention a comment will get
from the agency. Reportedly, it “found that often, only comments that
include a serious legal argument or are affiliated with some known entity
like a big business or academic institution, make their way in” to the

Timothy Ide, The Rulemaking Matters! Mosaic, YOUTUBE (May 17, 2010)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRXFcurpE7U [https://perma.cc/RNN9-TEM2].
78 Sydney Ember, HuffPost, Breaking From Its Roots, Ends Unpaid Contributions, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/business/media/huffpost-unpaidcontributors.html [https://perma.cc/X5TG-JL9C] (quoting Lydia Polgreen).
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preamble of the final rule.79 The implication is that the agency pays
attention only to big shots. But, of course, the mere fact that comments
from “a big business or academic institution” earn replies does not prove
that it is the identity of the commenter that is the causal explanation. It
seems more likely that the identity of the commenter and the preambular
response are both related to a third, important, and legitimate factor: the
substance of the comment.80
A slight variation on this objection posits that agencies will ignore
malattributed comments because of their source and in the process also
ignore authentic ones, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It is not
clear why this should happen. If the agency segregates malattributed
comments, it will not (and that is an argument for making some effort to
do so). Even without such a process, the baby goes out with the bathwater
only if the agency is just counting heads and concludes that since so many
votes are fake the overall vote tally cannot be trusted. At this point, the
reader knows the response to that objection and I will not repeat it.
For all these reasons, the “swamping” or “drowning out” hypothesis
is unconvincing. The most that can be said is that any deluge of unique
comments, malattributed or not, must slow things up somewhat, with
little or no offsetting benefit.
C.

Loss of Public Confidence

News coverage of the malattributed comments issue surely has had
some impact on public confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of
agency rulemaking. I am not aware of any actual polling on this, but
casual attention to social media tends to confirm what one would suspect
anyway. Neither the amount of the decline, nor the harm it causes, can be
quantified. But at a time when trust in government is otherwise

79 Issie Lapowsky, How Bots Broke the FCC’s Comment System, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:19
PM), https://www.wired.com/story/bots-broke-fcc-public-comment-system/ [https://perma.cc/
9TZ3-7KS2].
80 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,
430 (2005) (concluding that “sophistication,” i.e. “rhetorical, cognitive, and technical
complexity,” not commenter identity, predicts whether an agency adopts a comment’s
suggestions).
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extraordinarily low, this phenomenon has only further corroded public
confidence.
It is important to recognize, however, that the real villain here is not
malattributed comments but rather civic ignorance: the faulty
assumption, on the part not only of ordinary citizens but also of media
and other opinion leaders, that rulemaking is like elections and
comments are like votes. To the extent malattributed comments
undermine public confidence the problem could indeed be cured by
eliminating the comments, but it could also be cured by public education
regarding the nature of the comment process.
D.

Harm to “Identity Theft Victims”

One group, or at least some members of one group, feels a particular
and personal harm from malattributed comments: those whose names
were attached to comments they did not submit. As I discuss below, I do
not think it appropriate, legally or in lay terms, to call this “identity theft,”
though many do. And while there are identifiable human victims, the
harm is rather dilute and abstract. If I had the choice between, on the one
hand, having someone submit a comment with which I disagreed under
my name and with my email address and, on the other, having that person
clean out my bank account, I would certainly go with option one. In
Thomas Jefferson’s words, a malattributed comment “neither picks my
pocket nor breaks my leg.”81 However, it has not happened to me. Some
of those to whom it has happened are very upset.82 They feel a real sense

81 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 169 (1788) (“The legitimate
powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury
for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks
my leg.”).
82 See, e.g., Thousands of Fake Comments on Net Neutrality: A WSJ Investigation, supra note
10 (describing reaction of one “horrified” person whose name had been used). A group letter
from 27 individuals—not such a huge number, given the denominator—whose names were used
to file malattributed comments with the FCC communicates a sense of having been wronged. See
Letter to the FCC from People Whose Names and Addresses Were Used to Submit Fake Comments
Against Net Neutrality, FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE (May 25, 2017, 10:40 AM)
https://www.fightforthefuture.org/news/2017-05-25-letter-to-the-fcc-from-people-whosenames-and [https://perma.cc/4EPC-STMB].
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of violation, intrusion, and expropriation, even if it is a little difficult to
pin down the exact harm that has occurred.83
One can imagine a more substantial individual harm. In a world in
which a single ill-considered tweet can destroy reputations and careers,
severe reputational harm can flow from holding a repellent position. If
the position is one that the person does not in fact hold, the harm is that
much more severe. Suppose, for example, the Interior Department were
to hold notice-and-comment proceedings on President Trump’s
proposal to create a “National Garden of American Heroes,”84 and a troll
farm submitted public comments, under real people’s names, that
advocated for the inclusion of Confederate generals and the exclusion of
Black heroes. Now suppose that, given the salience of the issues and the
boldness of the comments, the comments were discovered by the media,
prospective employers, or just a few people with large twitter followings.85
Denying, truthfully, that you actually submitted the comment is unlikely
to solve the problem. Given how invisible rulemaking dockets are, this
scenario is unlikely. It requires a particular confluence of circumstances.
And as online threats to reputation go, it is pretty far down the list. But it
is not inconceivable.
E.

Cover for an Agency Operating in Bad Faith

Thus far I have been assuming, perhaps naïvely, that the agency is
acting in good faith. That will not always be the case, unfortunately. An
agency official pursuing a predetermined outcome and looking for cover
may find it in malattributed comments. The FCC rulemaking is not an
example; if the FCC was operating in bad faith it was in that it had its
mind made up before the comment period. There is no indication that it
was influenced by, relied on, overemphasized, or trumpeted the
83 One hint as to the challenge of pinning down the exact harm is the vagueness of a statement
from the California Department of Justice that “urge[d] Californians to check whether they have
been impacted” by the malattributed comments in the net neutrality proceeding. Kevin Oliver,
More Sacramento Victims Discovered in FCC Fake Comments Scam, KCRA (Dec. 15, 2017),
http://www.kcra.com/article/more-sacramento-victims-discovered-in-fcc-fake-commentsscam/14445643 [https://perma.cc/8LRP-KK68]. How would Californians actually go about
“checking” for “impact”?
84 See Exec. Order No. 13934, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,165 (July 3, 2020).
85 I am indebted to Jonathan Rusch for the hypothetical.
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malattributed comments. But a pending SEC rulemaking provides a
cautionary tale. In December 2019, the SEC proposed a rule regarding
exemptions from the proxy rules for proxy voting advice.86 Prior to the
proposal, it held a roundtable in 2018 and invited follow-up submissions,
of which it received about five hundred. In announcing the proposed rule,
the Commission Chair, Jay Clayton, invoked several of these:
Some of the letters that struck me the most came from long-term Main
Street investors, including an Army veteran and a Marine veteran, a
police officer, a retired teacher, a public servant, a single Mom, a
couple of retirees who saved for retirement, all of whom expressed
concerns about the current proxy process.87

Later reporting put those letters in a different light. All had been
assembled, organized, and written by an industry group called the 60 Plus
Association, which is funded by supporters of the SEC proposal.88 The
retired teacher did sign her letter but had not written it; the vets were the
brother and cousin of the chair of 60 Plus; the single mom did not write
her letter; the retired couple were the in-laws of the head of 60 Plus and
when contacted had no recollection of ever writing any such letter; the
public servant reported that she had been contacted by a public affairs
firm out of the blue, that she did not know what a proxy adviser is, and
“[t]hey wrote [the letter], and I allowed them to use my name after I read
it. I didn’t go digging into all of this.”89
Clayton has been evasive when questioned about the letters,
insisting, as one would expect, that the proposed rule will protect “Main
Street investors” even if the specific Main Street investors he invoked

See 84 Fed. Reg. 66518 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240).
Statement of Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, at Open Meeting on Proposals to Enhance the
Accuracy, Transparency and Effectiveness of Our Proxy Voting System (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2019-11-05-open-meeting
[https://perma.cc/EV3H-ZRA2].
88 Zachary Mider & Ben Elgin, SEC Chairman Cites Fishy Letters in Support of Policy Change,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-19/
sec-chairman-cites-fishy-letters-in-support-of-policy-change [https://perma.cc/ER4B-NZ7P].
89 Id. All in all, 60 Plus got about two-dozen people with connections to the organization to
submit letters. The 60 Plus president insisted, by the way, that his mother- and father-in-law had
known about the letter they supposedly submitted: “They are 80-some-years-old. This happened
months ago. I’m sure it’s not top of their minds.” Id.
86
87
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were actually a front for a corporate lobbyist.90 Did these letters actually
have an impact on the SEC? It is possible, but it seems more likely that
they were useful material to cite in support, as the folks at 60 Plus knew
they would be. Clayton did not want to be seen as the tool of large
corporate interests. Invoking the manufactured letters was more public
relations than “reasoned decision-making.” But the real failing was not
that the letters had such a dubious pedigree but that Clayton was making
policy based on snippets and anecdotes, like Presidents of both parties do
when pointing to invited guests at the State of the Union address.91
In any event, this little episode (itself only an anecdote that should
not be too heavily relied upon) is not a cautionary tale about standard
“fraudulent comments.” None or almost none of the letters were
submitted in the name of someone who did not know about it. Rather, it
is a cautionary tale about inaccuracy. The content of the letters was
misleading; for the most part the names of the submitters were not. Again,
that is always a potential problem, to which the agency must be alert, but
one that is distinct from the problem of malattributed comments at issue
here.
V.

ARE MALATTRIBUTED COMMENTS ILLEGAL?

Many have asserted that submitting malattributed comments is
illegal if not actually criminal. FCC Commissioner Rosenworcel, for
example, describes the net neutrality fiasco thus: “As many as nine and a
half million people had their identities stolen and used to file fake
90 Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (Dec. 10, 2019) (testimony of Jay Clayton),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/oversight-of-the-securities-and-exchangecommission [https://perma.cc/WM8C-EN95]. At this hearing, Clayton was pressed by Senator
Smith, id. at 1:17:10, and berated by Senator Van Hollen, id. at 1:49:30. The latter’s go-to phrase,
used three times, was: “You got duped.” Id.
91 In fairness, when it appeared, the preamble to the proposed rule did not take this anecdotal
approach or mention the misleading letters. See 84 Fed. Reg. 66518 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240). Of course, a preamble is written by career staff, not the
Commissioners. The gap between Chairman Clayton’s public statements and the preamble may
indicate that political appointees are more vulnerable to being misled by misattributed or other
inaccurate comments. See supra at 119. Or it may reflect a rhetorical difference resulting from
the different audiences—most importantly, the fact that a key audience for the preamble is a
reviewing court.
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comments, which is a crime under both federal and state laws.”92 Alas,
she does not state what those federal and state laws are. She has lots of
company, both in asserting that a crime has been committed and in
failing to specify what the crime actually is.93 This Section reviews possible
legal theories.
One observation at the outset. Despite heated rhetoric, it is notable
that not one state or federal prosecutor has brought a prosecution arising
out of the net neutrality rulemaking or any other instance of so-called
fraudulent comments. It is possible, of course, that they just have bigger
fish to fry. But the very fact that no prosecutions have been brought in
itself at least suggests that the nation’s law enforcers have concluded that
the activity, however annoying or reprehensible, is not actually criminal
or, even if technically so, not sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution.
A.

Fraud

The most obvious crime that might be committed by filing
“fraudulent comments” would be, natch, fraud. The fit is poor.

92 In the Matters of Nicholas Confessore and Jeremy Singer-Vine, FOIA Control No. 2017-764;
FOIA Control No. 2018-204, slip op. at 14 (Dec. 3, 2018) (dissenting statement of Comm’r Jessica
Rosenworcel).
93 For example, consider this exchange between National Public Radio’s Ari Shapiro and Wall
Street Journal reporter James Grimaldi:

SHAPIRO: I mean, do you generally see the same language over and over again? Do
you see made-up names? Do you see names of dead people?
GRIMALDI: Yeah. Well, all of the above. We found a lot of that. But the thing we were
most interested in beyond the fake names who are Barack Obama when we knew it
wasn’t him, we were looking for people whose identities appear to have been stolen or
used in some way or tricked to put a comment that they didn’t agree with.
SHAPIRO: This is actually a felony. Is there any accountability here?
GRIMALDI: So far, there’s really no enforcement of this rule.
“WSJ” Analysis Shows Fake Comments Submitted to Government Agencies, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/27/573870693/wsj-analysis-showsfake-comments-submitted-to-government-agencies [https://perma.cc/B4BY-GV35].
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General Principles

Fraud and misrepresentation are not the same thing. A flat lie about
the commenter’s identity involves a misrepresentation, but a
misrepresentation is only one part of the crime or tort of fraud. The
classic statement of common-law fraud—“five finger fraud”—has five
elements: (1) a false statement of a material fact, (2) knowledge on the
part of the defendant that the statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part
of the defendant to deceive the alleged victim, (4) justifiable reliance by
the alleged victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as
a result.94 The injury must involve the deprivation of money, property, or
a legal right.
Some of these requirements are undeniably met by malattributed
comments. They do involve a false statement of fact. (Whether that false
statement is material is a separate question that I put aside until Section
2.e, below.) The maker of the statement surely knows that the statement
is untrue. Often, there will be an intent to deceive, though when a
comment is submitted under the name of the agency head, or Mickey
Mouse, or Barack Obama, or Elvis Presley, the impossibility of actual
deception negates intent. But the final two requirements are very
problematic. It will be rare that the agency relies on the stated identity of
the commenter. If the comment is duplicative—as is generally the case—
most agencies will not even read the duplicates and so not even notice, let
alone rely on, the name of the persons allegedly submitting. Further, if it
has not relied on and is unaware, then by definition the fifth prong is not
satisfied because any injury is not “as a result” of the false statement.
But assume that somehow or other the agency does rely on the fact
that a comment purports to be from a particular individual when it is not.
How might this harm the agency? It would do so only if the agency places
particular weight on, or heavily discounts, the comment in light of the
identity of the person who supposedly wrote it. An agency might do that
when the comment comes from a very well-known or well-placed source.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) will pay particular attention
to comments from General Motors (GM) or Ralph Nader when
See, e.g., Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255, 1270 (Alaska 2016); Commonwealth v.
Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1249 (Mass. 2015); Pasternack v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 59 N.E.3d
485, 491 (N.Y. 2016).
94
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establishing vehicle safety standards. But it is hard to imagine a malicious
commenter successfully convincing DOT that she is actually GM,
particularly if the real GM has a sufficient interest in the proceeding to
file a comment or at least monitor the docket. Thus, it is unlikely that
there is an actual harm to the agency.
Moreover, if there is a harm, it will be that it reached a policy
conclusion that it would not otherwise have reached. This may be
conceptualized as a harm to the agency or as a harm to either the
regulated community or to regulatory beneficiaries (depending on the
direction of the error). One problem with the second conceptualization
is that courts are reluctant to allow a plaintiff (here a regulated entity or
regulatory beneficiary) to establish the reliance element of a fraud claim
by showing that a third party (here the agency) relied on the defendant’s
false statement.95 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that “bad policy” is the
sort of injury that qualifies under the fifth prong. The cases are replete
with statements that the requisite injury must be “of a pecuniary or
substantial character.”96 The boundaries are debatable, of course, but we
are certainly some distance from the classic setting involving a specific
and tangible physical loss.97
Finally, and most importantly, the causation problems with this
claim are overwhelming. Proving that if only the agency had known the
actual source of a pseudonymous comment, it would have reached a
different outcome, would be impossible. In the net neutrality rulemaking
the idea is laughable, and in any setting the causal chain would be obscure
at best. It is hard enough to know whether comments as a whole have an
influence; harder still to show that a single comment was influential;
harder still to show that the false identity attached to a comment was
influential; and impossible to show that that “influence” was powerful
enough to affect the outcome of the rulemaking.

95 Pasternack, 59 N.E.3d 485; but see Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653
(2008).
96 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 69 (2020).
97 The following subsection returns to this issue under federal law.
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Federal Fraud Crimes

The federal criminal code includes a variety of fraud crimes. Much
of the foregoing discussion applies to possible prosecutions under those
provisions, but a few specific comments are in order.
a.

Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud

The basic and oldest federal fraud provision outlaws the use of the
mail as part of “any scheme or artifice to defraud.”98 The wire fraud
provision uses similar language.99 Any comment that is not handdelivered is communicated either by mail or by computer; if the latter, a
“wire” is used. Accordingly, one or the other of these provisions applies
to the submission of almost all rulemaking comments. Is misleading an
agency as to the identity of a commenter criminal fraud?
The crime requires a “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.”100 This could be read to reach two different
kinds of conduct: (a) a scheme to defraud or (b) a scheme to obtain
money or property through false or fraudulent statements. So read, the
“scheme to defraud” would be illegal even if not part of an effort to obtain
“money or property.” However, courts have uniformly “[c]onstru[ed]
that disjunctive language as a unitary whole,” so the “money-orproperty” requirement applies equally across the board.101 The property
can be intangible—information, a right to collect payment in the future—
but must still be something historically understood as a property
interest.102

98 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018) (making it a crime to use the mails “for the purpose of executing”
or attempting to execute a “scheme to defraud, or for means of obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises”).
99 Id. § 1343.
100 Id. § 1341 (2018).
101 Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571 (2020).
102 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355–56 (2005) (holding that Canadian
government’s entitlement to uncollected taxes on liquor imported by the defendant constituted
“property”); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–26 (1987) (applying the statute to a
scheme to obtain confidential business information); United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580,
590 (3d Cir. 2004) “(“[T]he object of the alleged scheme or artifice to defraud must be a
traditionally recognized property right.”); Lombardo v. United States, 865 F.2d 155, 159–60 (7th
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In addition, conviction requires establishing specific intent to
defraud. An intent to make a false statement is deceit but not fraud; the
defendant “must specifically intend to lie or cheat or misrepresent with
the design of depriving the victim of something of value.”103 And, again,
that “something of value” must be money or property. It is very hard to
fit an effort to influence policy outcomes in rulemaking into this box.
In McNally v. United States,104 the Supreme Court relied on this
definition of “defraud” in reversing a conviction resting on the intangible
deprivation of public employees’ “honest services.”105 Congress quickly
amended the definition of “scheme to defraud” to include deprivation of
the “intangible right of honest services.”106 That vague phrase sowed
decades of confusion, as courts searched for principled boundaries to the
conduct constituting a deprivation of this “intangible right.”107 The
uncertainty culminated in the Court’s 2010 decision in Skilling v. United
States.108 Motivated in part by concerns over notice and vagueness, the
Court held that the deprivation of honest services extends only to
instances of bribes and kickbacks.
Applying the mail and wire fraud provisions to submission of
“fraudulent comments” requires a showing that the submitter had the
specific intent either to deprive others of their right to the agency’s
“honest services” or to obtain money or property. Skilling precludes the
first theory; there is nothing resembling a bribe or kickback here. The
second theory is initially more plausible. Many submitters are likely
financially motivated. Certainly hackers or public relations firms retained
to do the actual work of creating and submitting the comments are doing
it for the money. The underlying motivation for whoever is in the
background may be ideological or disruptive, but presumably many or
most seek a policy that will be in their economic interest. Even if this
chain of causation leading to money or property suffices, however, this
Cir. 1989). Cf. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 19–23 (2000) (finding that an unissued
state license is not “money or property”).
103 United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012).
104 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
105 Id. at 358.
106 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018).
107 See generally Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
108 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
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theory hits an insuperable doctrinal obstacle. To violate the statute, the
scheme must seek to obtain money or property from the person defrauded.
That is the long-standing, if usually unarticulated, understanding; it
characterizes traditional frauds. Usually, the question does not arise;
prosecutors rarely bring cases that do not involve a victim who was both
lied to and lost property. But when they have, the courts have explicitly
held that the money or property obtained must be that of the person
defrauded.109 Obtaining a regulatory regime that in turn enables an entity
to charge high prices or obtain more customers and in that way obtain
money does not qualify.
The closest case is Cleveland v. United States.110 This was a
racketeering prosecution that alleged underlying acts of mail fraud. The
alleged mail fraud was the submission of false information in applications
to the state of Louisiana for a license to operate a video poker machine.
The applicant was a limited partnership and identified two individuals as
the beneficial owners of the partnership; in fact those two had nothing to
do with the operation; they were the children of one of the actual partners,
that partner had tax and financial issues that might have kept him from
obtaining the license. The applications thus were undeniably false—false
in just the same way that malattributed comments are. But in a
unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that
they were not fraudulent because they did not deprive the State of

109 The leading decision explicitly so holding is probably United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d
1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1998). The setting is not identical to the submission of malattributed
comments in that it involved payments from the victim (universities) to another party (student
athletes) rather than to the fraudster (a sports agent who had entered into contracts with student
athletes that made them ineligible to receive their scholarships). But the principle articulated
applies equally in this setting:

Not until today have we dealt with a scheme in which the defendants’ profits were to
come from legitimate transactions in the market, rather than at the expense of the
victims. Both the “scheme or artifice to defraud” clause and the “obtaining money or
property” clause of § 1343 contemplate a transfer of some kind. Accordingly, following
both the language of § 1341 and the implication of Tanner, we hold that only a scheme
to obtain money or other property from the victim by fraud violates § 1341. A
deprivation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of mail fraud. Losses that occur
as byproducts of a deceitful scheme do not satisfy the statutory requirement.
Id. at 1227. The opinion is usefully described and elaborated in Thomas J. Miles, Dupes and Losers
in Mail Fraud, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1111 (2010).
110 Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
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Louisiana of property or money. Rather, “whatever interests Louisiana
might be said to have in its video poker licenses, the State’s core concern
is regulatory.”111 The license-holder has a property interest in the license,
but the un-issued license is not property held by the state, and that is what
matters.112 And it seems no one even argued that it was enough that the
goal of the scheme was to obtain a regulatory determination that would
in turn allow the fraudster to obtain money from third parties. “We
conclude that § 1341 requires the object of the fraud to be ‘property’ in
the victim’s hands and that a Louisiana video poker license in the State’s
hands is not ‘property’ under § 1341.”113
Submission of “fraudulent comments” seeks a different kind of
government decision—issuance of an economically valuable regulation
rather than of an economically valuable permit. But the principles set out
in Cleveland are identical. The state has not lost anything that qualifies as
“money or property.”114 An ulterior financial goal is irrelevant; what
matters is what the defendant is seeking to obtain from the defrauded
party. Indeed, if there is any distinction between a permit and a
regulation, it would seem that the former is the stronger case for
application of a theory of fraud. It is at least a kind of property, it is limited
in number, it is valuable only to the specific holder rather than a larger
class of entities, it is the basis of a more direct and certain financial gain.
Accordingly, whatever it is, submission of “fraudulent comments” is
not “fraud” under federal law.115

111

Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).

Id. at 15 (“It does not suffice . . . that the object of the fraud may become property in the
recipient’s hands; for the purposes of the mail fraud statute, the thing obtained must be property
in the hands of the victim.”).
113 Id. at 26–27.
112

114 For a completely different rulemaking case, one that does involve fraud, consider United
States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019). There the alleged fraud involved obtaining
confidential pre-decisional information from a rulemaking agency; armed with this information,
the defendant knew regulatory outcomes in advance and traded stocks accordingly. This falls
within the statute not because the ultimate goal was to make money or because the rulemaking
process was involved, but because what was obtained by deceit from the agency—the
information—qualifies as property. Id. at 30–34.
115 The Supreme Court has read into these statutes a materiality requirement. See Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 1–3 (1999). That, too, would bar a fraud prosecution for submitting
misattributed comments, but I defer discussion to Section V.B, infra.
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Email Fraud

Title 18 separately prohibits “[f]raud and related activity in
connection with electronic mail.”116 At least some malattributed
comments are sent by email, and the provision does make it a crime to
“relay or retransmit multiple commercial electronic mail messages, with
the intent to deceive or mislead recipients . . . as to the origin of such
messages.”117 That might apply here except for the restriction to
“commercial” messages. This Section does not define “commercial,” but
it incorporates by reference the definitions in the CAN-SPAM Act.118
That legislation in turn defines the term “commercial electronic mail
message” as “any electronic mail message the primary propose of which
is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product
or service.”119 That is not what malattributed comments are.
c.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The memorandum from the staff of the House Committee on
Financial Services invokes yet another provision.120 That is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030, entitled “Fraud and related activity in connection with
computers.”121 In searching for a provision that might cover “fraudulent
comments” submitted by bots, this sounds promising. But at its core, the
law is aimed at a very different kind of activity: accessing a computer
without authorization and obtaining information or data—in a word,
hacking. Courts have varied significantly in how broadly to read its
provisions; some read it to prohibit use of a public website in a manner
inconsistent with its terms of use, others limit it to situations of actual

116 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 18
U.S.C. § 1037 (2018).
117 Id. § 1037(a)(2).
118 Id. § 1037(d)(4).
119 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15
U.S.C. § 7702(2)(A) (2018).
120 Memorandum from Majority Staff of House Committee on Financial Services to Members
of the Committee 2, n.10 (Feb. 3, 2020), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg116-ba09-20200206-sd002.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM68-M4J9].
121 This provision was adopted in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and then
substantially amended just two years later by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA); it has
been amended eight times since, most recently in 2008.
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harmful hacking.122 The ultimate goal is protecting information housed
on private or government computers.123 So most of it is plainly
inapplicable.124
The one provision that might apply is subsection (a)(4), which
makes it a crime to access a computer without authorization or in
exceedance of authorization with intent to defraud.125 Online
submissions of malattributed comments use a computer—two, actually:
the sender’s and the government’s—and if the submission is an effort to
“defraud” perhaps we have discovered a violation. I have argued above
that such comments are not properly understood as an effort to defraud,
strictly speaking. But courts have been quite loose in their understanding
of “defraud” in this setting, explicitly holding that common-law fraud
does not have to be shown.126 But the reason that is so is that, in keeping
with the nature of the provision as a whole, the core of the offense is not
“fraud” but the unauthorized access of someone else’s computer and the
obtaining something of value. The legislative history confirms what the
text indicates: Congress did not seek to criminalize any fraud that was
conducted using a computer; it explicitly rejected proposals to pattern the
new law on the mail and wire fraud statutes.127
To be prosecuted under [section 1030(a)(4)], the use of the computer
must be more directly linked to the intended fraud. That is, it must be

122 The cases are discussed in Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
1143 (2016). Kerr argues that the best understanding of this and similar statutes is by analogy to
physical trespass. Under his approach, filing malattributed comments would not seem to violate
the statute since the submitter has merely entered publicly available “space” at the invitation of
the agency.
123 See HiQ Labs v. LinkedIn, 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing S. REP. NO. 104-357,
at 7 (1996)).
124 A useful summary is OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES (2015).
125 This section makes it a crime when someone “knowingly and with intent to defraud,
accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means
of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of
the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such
use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2018).
126 See Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc. v. Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d
1122, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The term ‘defraud’ for purposes of § 1030(a)(4) simply means
wrongdoing and does not require proof of common law fraud.”).
127 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9 (1986).
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used by an offender without authorization or in excess of his
authorization to obtain property of another, which property furthers
the intended fraud.128

Thus, the reference to an intent to defraud and obtaining a thing of
value separate this subsection from earlier provisions that criminalized,
as misdemeanor rather than felony, simply accessing and obtaining
information from someone’s computer. The “intent to defraud” language
is inartful, but the legislative history makes clear that the fundamental
concern was hacking into a computer and obtaining/stealing
information, and that the offense was more serious when that
information was used to obtain a thing of value.129
Accordingly, even if malattributed commenters have an intent to
defraud, they have not violated the CFAA. The provision requires that the
defendant “access a computer” “without authorization” or “exceed
authorized access” and then obtain a thing of value. That is not what is
happening. First, virtually no information is obtained. Second, while
going on to regulations.gov or uploading comments to the FCC’s
Electronic Comment Filing System does involve “accessing a
computer,130 that is not done “without authorization;” every member of

128
129

Id.
In the words of the Senate Report:

The Committee remains convinced that there must be a clear distinction between
computer theft, punishable as a felony [under subsection (a)(4)], and computer
trespass, punishable [under subsection (a)(2)] in the first instance as a misdemeanor.
The element in the new paragraph (a)(4), requiring a showing of an intent to defraud,
is meant to preserve that distinction, as is the requirement that the property wrongfully
obtained via computer furthers the intended fraud.
Id. at 10; see also 132 CONG. REC. 7128, 7189 (1986) (“The acts of fraud we are addressing in
proposed section 1030(a)(4) are essentially thefts in which someone uses a Federal interest
computer to wrongfully obtain something of value from another . . . Proposed section 1030(a)(4)
is intended to reflect the distinction between theft of information, a felony, and mere
unauthorized access, a misdemeanor.”) (statement of Sen. Laxalt).
130 One other question is whether, even if it is accessing a computer, it is accessing a “protected
computer,” as the statute requires. That is a term of art and the definition does not seem to reach
the public portions of a government website. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A) (2018). On the other
hand, any computer that is used in or affecting interested commerce is also a “protected
computer.” Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B). Some courts have held that any time a person uses the Internet
that requirement is met. See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007). None
of these cases involved government websites. If any computer, governmental or private,
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the public is authorized to use the site to submit comments. Now, one
could argue that if commenters are not authorized to post pseudonymous
comments (explicitly? implicitly?) the poster exceeds authorized access
by accessing the site for this impermissible (unauthorized) purpose. In
some settings, courts have accepted such an argument.131 But that
argument, which is already at the outer bounds of judicial readings of the
statute,132 proves too much in this setting. Any violation of the agency’s
guidelines for commenting—page limits, deadlines, format, relevance—
now becomes a federal crime.
The CFAA is likely inapplicable for one last reason. A violation
requires not just an intent to defraud but that the person “by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value.”
If we assume that there is fraud here (a big “if”), there is still no violation
unless the commenter has actually “obtain[ed] anything of value.” That
is not a defined term, but against the background of traditional fraud,
McNalley, the overall legislative history of the Act, and the text itself, the
“thing of value” would seem to be not an indirect ultimate goal, but
something that is actually found on the computer that has been accessed
without authorization, such as credit card numbers, a competitor’s trade
secrets, or customer’s email addresses. It is hard to fit a desired regulatory

connected to the Internet is a “protected computer” then this conduct does involve protected
computers.
131 See, e.g., EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 703 F. App’x. 803, 808 (11th Cir. 2017)
(suggesting that “a person exceeds authorized access if he or she uses the access in a way that
contravenes any policy or term of use governing the computer in question”); United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Access to a computer and data that can be obtained
from that access may be exceeded if the purposes for which access has been given are exceeded.”).
But see Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] violation
of the terms of use of a website—without more—cannot establish liability under the CFAA.”).
132 Orin Kerr proposes a useful and sensible test for when accessing a website is without
authorization. Drawing on the web’s norm of openness, he suggests that the authorization line
should be deemed crossed only when access is gained by bypassing an authentication
requirement. An authentication requirement, such as a password gate, is needed to create the
necessary barrier that divides open spaces from closed spaces on the Web. This line achieves an
appropriate balance for computer trespass law. It protects privacy when meaningful steps are
taken to seal off access from the public while also creating public rights to use the Internet free
from fear of prosecution. Kerr, supra note 122, at 1161. Under this standard, submission of
malattributed comments, however problematic, and even if in violation of explicit agency
instructions with regard to the filing of comments, just is not a violation of the statute.
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outcome into that box, even if it could be shown that such an outcome was
obtained, which it almost certainly could not.
d.

Conspiracy to Defraud the United States—Impairing Government
Functions

For a century and a half, federal law has made it a crime to conspire
to defraud the United States.133 The current version, 18 U.S.C. § 371, dates
to 1948.134 It makes it a crime to “conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose.”135 A conspiracy to defraud the
United States, as opposed to a conspiracy to commit a specific offense
against the United States, is generally referred to as a “Klein
conspiracy.”136 The meaning of “defraud” under § 371 is broader than its
definition at common law or in the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.137
Section 371 is not limited to schemes that deprive the government of
money or property,138 it reaches “any conspiracy for the purpose of

133 See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (prohibiting conspiracy to “defraud
the United States in any manner whatsoever”).
134 Pub. L. No. 80-772, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 701 (1948) (codifying Title 18 into positive law).
On the background of the current provision, see H.R. REP. NO. 304, at A28–29 (1947).
135 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (emphasis added). The provision reads in full:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of
the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not
exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Id.
136 See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957); see generally Gretchen C.F. Shappert
& Christopher J. Costantini, Klein Conspiracy: Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 61 U.S.
ATT’YS’ BULL. 1 (July 2013).
137 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966) (“It has long been established that
this statutory language is not confined to fraud as that term has been defined in the common
law.”); United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 831 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “it is well
established that the term ‘defraud’ as used in section 371 is ‘interpreted much more broadly than
when it is used in the mail and wire fraud statutes.’”) (quoting United States v. Rosengarten, 857
F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1988)).
138 E.g., Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (“To conspire to defraud
the United States means primarily to cheat the government out of property or money, but it also
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impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any
department of Government.”139 That language—“impair, obstruct or
defeat a lawful governmental function”—dates to a 1910 Supreme Court
decision140 and is not actually in the statute, but is widely invoked as if it
is.141 And it is extraordinarily broad. That breadth creates room for
creative possible uses of “the prosecutor’s darling,”142 but is also
unsettling and counsels some caution.143 In any event, because the caselaw
is so expansive and untied to the statutory term (“defraud”), § 371 seems
the most promising of the federal fraud provisions to apply in this setting.
Submission of millions of (unique) comments does impede a lawful
government function. The deluge makes it harder for the agency to get a
rule out the door, which delays the regulatory benefit or relief from
restriction the rule provides. But that alone does not violate § 371 because
there is no element of trick or deceit.144 To find a violation, it is necessary
to identify how exactly the use of a phony name on one, or a million,

means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful government functions . . . .”); United States
v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 630 (11th Cir. 1984).
139 Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479–80 (1910) (upholding convictions under this provision
where the defendants had submitted false information to the Department of Agriculture, thereby
skewing its published statistics).
140 Id. at 479.
141 See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987) (noting that Section 371 reaches
“any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any
department of Government”); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1313 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)) (“[T]he crime of conspiracy
to defraud the United States includes acts that interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful
governmental functions by deceit, craft, or trickery, or by means that are dishonest.”).
142 See, e.g., William C. Tucker, Deceitful Tongues: Is Climate Change Denial a Crime?, 39
ECOL. L.Q. 831, 878–91 (2012) (arguing that coordinated efforts to mislead the public and
government regulators regarding the seriousness of climate change violate § 371). It was Learned
Hand who referred to conspiracy as “that darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.” Harrison
v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
143 For criticism, see Jeremy H. Temkin, Time to Revisit the ‘Klein’ Conspiracy Doctrine,
N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/2013-01-25-time-torevisit-the-klein-conspiracy-doctrine/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Time%20to%
20Revisit%20the%20%E2%80%98Klein%E2%80%99%20Conspiracy%20Doctrine.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XAX5-DYFD].
144 See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that § 371 does
not impose an obligation on individuals to make the government’s job easier or to avoid
obstructing government activity; the statute is triggered only when obstruction is accomplished
through dishonesty or deceit).
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comments obstructs the agency’s functioning. The argument seems
conceivable. Just as the Special Counsel’s indictment of Russian
conspirators alleged a violation of § 371 through the use of phony social
media posts in order to derail and alter the outcome of the 2016
election,145 so phony rulemaking comments can be seen as an effort to
derail and alter the outcome of the rulemaking process. By making the
agency think a raft of non-existent individuals support a particular
outcome, the submitter is attempting to influence the final decision. For
reasons set out above, it is unlikely to succeed in doing so, but that is
irrelevant to the existence of a conspiracy to impair, obstruct, or defeat
lawful functions. And if the agency is influenced by false information in
a submission, its functions have been impeded or impaired in the sense
that it failed to reach the “right” result.
Nonetheless, tying the trick or deceit to the obstruction is not
straightforward. In the case of Russian election meddling, it was essential
to the effect of the disinformation that people reading the posts thought
they came from ordinary Americans rather than Russian bots or
dissemblers. The whole impact depended on creating the impression that
lots of Americans possessed certain information, doubts, and beliefs. If
each post were clearly identified as coming from the Internet Research
Agency, the effect would have been lost. That is just not the case with
malattributed comments; the impact does not hinge on the commenter’s
identity. It should not even hinge on the belief that there is an actual
commenter behind the comment.
Moreover, using a false identity on a comment is quite different
from lying on one’s tax return, or submitting false information about
campaign contributions to the Federal Election Commission, or giving a
police officer a phony name. In general, Klein conspiracies are charged in
Indictment ¶¶ 2, 28, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. Feb 16, 2018) (alleging conspiracy “to defraud the United States by impairing,
obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the government through fraud and deceit for
the purpose of interfering with the U.S. political and electoral processes, including the
presidential election of 2016”). The sufficiency of the indictment was upheld in United States v.
Concord Management & Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). Notably, the court
had reservations about the claim that affirmative misrepresentations (as opposed to a refusal to
comply with statutorily imposed reporting obligations) would obstruct legitimate government
functions. “The difficulty for the government . . . is not identifying deceit—of which there is
plenty—but connecting that deceit to [a particular] lawful government function . . . which the
defendants allegedly conspired to impair.” Id. at 51.
145
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tax cases;146 another common setting involves the failure to disclose
information to the government when there is a legal obligation to
disclose.147 Those standard § 371 “impairments” all directly obstruct
agency enforcement activities. Additionally, the impossibility of showing
substantial harm to the federal government or an agency will disincline
any prosecutor to pursue such a case.
Finally, the crime here is not making the false statements, it is
conspiracy. So any actual prosecution would have to show an agreement
between multiple people. That will often but not always be possible.
e.

Obstructing Agency Proceedings

The cluster of criminal provisions regarding obstruction of justice148
includes a prohibition on obstructing proceedings before agencies and
departments.149 There is a sense, as the prior section indicates, in which
submission of an malattributed comment “obstructs” an agency
“proceeding.” However, the text of this provision, as opposed to its title,
make it a poor fit. As one would expect from its placement in a set of
provisions regarding obstruction of justice, the section is aimed at agency
See, e.g., United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2007).
See United States v. Murphy, 809 F.2d 1427, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Where the
regulations implementing the Act [administered by the agency] do not impose a duty to disclose
information, failure to disclose is not conspiracy to defraud the government.”).
148 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (2018).
149 Id. § 1505. The provision provides, in full:
146
147

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance, in whole or in
part, with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust
Civil Process Act, willfully withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place,
conceals, covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any
documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony, which is
the subject of such demand; or attempts to do so or solicits another to do so; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct,
or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending
proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the
due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or
investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any
joint committee of the Congress—
Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense
involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned
not more than 8 years, or both.
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investigations and adjudications, the counterpart to criminal
investigations and trials that are the setting for most obstruction of justice
violations. No case has held that a notice-and-comment rulemaking is a
“proceeding” within the meaning of this section. Many cases assert that
“proceeding” is to be read broadly.150 But what they mean is that the term
is not limited to an actual adjudication but extends to the whole
investigatory process that precedes it.151
Even if a rulemaking qualifies as an agency “proceeding,” submitting
a phony or malattributed comment does not reach the level of obstruction
necessary. A violation of the first paragraph consists in withholding or
misrepresenting information in response to “any civil investigative
demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act.”
Notice-and-comment rulemaking fails on both counts: there is no
demand and the Antitrust Civil Process Act is irrelevant. A violation of
the second paragraph requires intimidating conduct—such as and
including threats and force—that goes far beyond simple submission of a
comment with the wrong person’s name on it.152
B.

Making False Statements

Moving away from fraud-based crimes, the obvious basis for a
possible prosecution is the ever-helpful prohibition on making “false,
fictitious, or fraudulent” statements to a federal agency found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.153 Most elements of the crime are clearly satisfied here. Though

150 See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 198–99 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Mitchell,
877 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that “decisions have uniformly held that th[e] term
[‘administrative proceeding’] should be construed broadly to effectuate the statute’s purpose”).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977); Rice v. United States, 356
F.2d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1966) (“[I]t would be absurd to hold that Congress meant to proscribe
interference with the administrative process only after a Labor Board proceeding had reached a
certain formal stage and let go unpunished individuals who obstruct earlier preliminary
proceedings by frightening witnesses into withdrawing charges out of fear for their lives.
Congress clearly intended to punish any obstruction of the administrative process by impeding
a witness in any proceeding before a governmental agency—at any stage of the proceedings, be
it adjudicative or investigative.”).
152 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2018).
153 As amended in 1996, this section provides:
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not “fraudulent,”154 a malattributed comment does make a “false” and
“fictitious” “statement or representation” in asserting that it is submitted
by someone other than the actual submitter. In addition, the falsehood is
knowing or willful. It is true that whoever is programming the computer
or authorizing the submissions does not know of each specific
misidentification, but that person does know that the misidentifications
are being made.
Next, a notice-and-comment rulemaking is “a matter within the
jurisdiction” of the agency conducting the rulemaking. While that
caselaw has historically produced some counterintuitive results,155 even
where courts have read the term “jurisdiction” narrowly, they have
frequently pointed to writing regulations as the sort of activity that is
within an agency’s jurisdiction.156 And the Supreme Court has more than
once admonished that the term should not be read technically or
narrowly.157 A notice-and-comment rulemaking is a setting in which the

Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense
involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned
not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A,
109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under this
section shall be not more than 8 years.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2018).
154 See supra Section IV.A.
155 For example, the Eighth Circuit once held that falsely telling the FBI that one’s missing
wife is involved in a plot to kill the President in order to induce the Bureau to go looking for her
does not involve a matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction. United States v. Rogers, 706 F.2d 854 (8th
Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that investigations by federal
agents are “matter[s] within the jurisdiction of a[] department or agency of the United States.”
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984).
156 See, e.g., Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1967) (explaining that
“jurisdiction” involves such things as the “power to adjudicate rights, establish binding
regulations, compel the action or finally dispose of the problem giving rise to the inquiry”).
157 Rogers, 466 U.S. at 480; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70–71 (1969).
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rulemaking agency has the “power to exercise authority,”158 both in the
sense of conducting the rulemaking and in the sense of issuing a
regulation, and accordingly is a matter within the agency’s jurisdiction.
One might argue that these false statements—or, more precisely, the
falsity of these statements—have no impact on the agency. FCC Chair Ajit
Pai, for example, certainly would say—he did say159—that the FCC was
not misled or even distracted by the millions of malattributed comments.
However, if this ineffectualness matters, it is relevant to materiality,
discussed below. The mere fact that the false statement was ineffective in
the individual instance does not mean the statute was not violated.
Section 1001 does not require that the government rely on or be
influenced by the statement,160 not realize that it was false,161 or suffer
pecuniary loss due to the statement.162
That leaves the central question—central to the § 1001 issue and
central to the larger inquiry: is the falsehood “material”?163 Under the
standard formulation, a statement is material under § 1001 if it “‘has a
natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision
of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.”164 A statement
can be material even if the agency was not actually misled or deceived and
United States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1993).
Letter from Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, to Michael E. Capuano, U.S. Representative, supra
note 17 (“Despite any suggestion that the public comment process was somehow ‘flawed’ or
‘tampered with’ by the alleged submission of comments under false names, any such activity did
not affect the Commission’s actual decision-making . . .”).
160 See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Trent,
949 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1991); Nilson Van
& Storage Co. v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1985).
161 Clay, 832 F.3d at 1309 (quoting United States v. Neder, 197 F.3d 1122, 1128 (11th Cir.
1999)).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Hawkins, 295
F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1961).
163 As originally enacted, the statute explicitly required materiality only with regard to
falsifying, concealing, or covering up a fact. The circuits split as to whether to read the
requirement into the prohibitions on false statements or writings. Congress resolved the split in
the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 2 (1996), separately
enumerating the three types of violation and making materiality an explicit requirement for each.
164 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770
(1988) (summarizing lower court rulings); United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1984).
Construing the same term in a different but similar provision, the Kungys Court adopted this
formulation: “whether the misrepresentation or concealment was predictably capable of
affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official decision.” Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771.
158
159
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in fact did not rely on the falsehood; it suffices if the falsehood would have
“a natural tendency” to influence, or be capable of affecting or
influencing, a governmental decision.165
Does the effect or influence of a comment hinge on who submitted
it? Would or should or, most importantly, does an agency treat a
comment from Joe Smith differently than one from Susan Jones? If not,
then the false name is not “material.” I will not repeat the discussion from
Section IV.A, but the point is that what matters is the content of the
comment, not the identity of its author. Using random names from the
phone book to misidentify the source of a comment is therefore not a
material misstatement.
A subcategory of malattributed comments would violate § 1001,
however. Suppose a comment falsely claims to be from someone with
extensive relevant expertise and experience—a Ph.D. research chemist, a
twenty-year line employee in the relevant industry, a user of a product
the agency proposes to ban, the owner of property in the neighborhood
of a regulated facility. Because the person’s supposed unique, relevant
experience would give the comment more weight, that misstatement
would be material. And if simply by using a particular person’s name that
information about background could be communicated, then just the
false name would be material. However, the sort of malattributed
comments that are controversial are not this kind of thing at all. They are
duplicative and generic, make no representations as to background or
expertise, and do not use recognizable names of experts.
C.

Identity Theft

In the wake of the net neutrality rulemaking Senator Rob Portman
complained: “Victims of identity theft are being misrepresented on
federal government websites, and agencies are doing little to protect
them.”166 The term “identity theft” gets tossed around quite a bit in these

U.S. v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976).
Press Release, Portman, Carper: Bipartisan Report Highlights Abuse of Online Regulatory
Comment Systems (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/portmancarper-bipartisan-report-highlights-abuse-online-regulatory-comment-systems
[https://perma.cc/Z5QL-UJWR].
165
166
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discussions.167 Too much. The term packs a punch but is not legally
accurate. The core instances of identity theft involve taking something
much less abstract than just a person’s “identity.” The contents of their
bank account, for example. Calling malattributed comments identity
theft is a nice rhetorical move, but it is both misleading and legally
unfounded.
The federal government and all states have criminal prohibitions on
certain uses of another’s personally identifying information, and these are
referred to, at least colloquially and sometimes statutorily, as “identity
theft.” There is no single legal definition. The classic form of “identity
theft” is the use of another’s credit card, bank account, or identification
documents in order to get money or use the victim’s credit to purchase
goods. Thus, there is a tangible, concrete benefit to the thief and/or harm
to the victim. As the leading practitioner’s guide puts it:
Succinctly stated, identity theft is the stealing of personal identification
information which belongs to another (the victim-owner of the
information), with the intent and for the purpose of fraudulently using
the information to gain money, goods, services, or other economic or
private benefit realized by the identity thief and any coconspirators.
There are two components of identity theft: (1) the stealing of personal
identification information belonging to another; and (2) the

167 See, e.g., U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 122, at
3 (objecting that the FCC lacks adequate remedies for “identity theft victims” as allowing them
to post a responsive or clarifying comment “potentially causes additional harm to victims of
identity theft”); Nicholas Confessore, New York Attorney General Expands Inquiry Into Net
Neutrality Comments, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/technology/
net-neutrality-inquiry-comments.html [https://perma.cc/5TMG-FLS4] (“[M]any comments on
net neutrality were falsely submitted under the names of real people, in what amounted to mass
acts of virtual identity theft.”); U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Press
Release (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/
carper-portman-bipartisan-report-highlights-abuse-of-online-regulatory-comment-systems
[https://perma.cc/XUB8-Y2C5] (“Examples of the misuse of the online regulatory commenting
system include rampant use of stolen identities to post comments on proposed regulations with
no recourse for identity theft victims . . . .”); Linder, supra note 5 (quoting Pennsylvania AG Josh
Shapiro referring to “massive identity theft”); Max Weiss, Deepfake Bot Submissions to Federal
Public Comment Websites Cannot Be Distinguished from Human Submissions, TECHNOLOGY
SCIENCE (Dec. 18, 2019), https://techscience.org/a/2019121801 [https://perma.cc/A3BH-ZEUC]
(“Comments [in the net neutrality rulemaking] came from email addresses, street addresses, and
postal codes stolen from unwitting victims, constituting countless instances of identity theft.”).
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fraudulent misuse of such information to economically enrich or
benefit the identity thief.168

For example, Wisconsin criminalizes the unauthorized use of
someone’s personal identifying information or documents
(a) To obtain credit, money, goods, services, employment, or any
other thing of value or benefit.
(b) To avoid civil or criminal process or penalty.
(c) To harm the reputation, property, person, or estate of the
individual. 169

It would be hard to prosecute malattributing commenters under this
statute. The comment does indeed “use” someone’s personal identifying
information—their name. But what makes that a crime is the purpose for
which it is done. “Influencing a federal rulemaking” does not come within
the three prohibited purposes. Yes, favorable federal policy is in a sense
“a thing of value.” But if ever ejusdem generis would seem to be
appropriate, it is here. The enumerated things of value are all tangible
items belonging to the person whose identity is stolen. Thus, identity theft
is a means, not an end; the harm that is of concern is not the intangible
intrusion or some change in the outside world; it is the loss of or damage
to something belonging to the victim.
Federal law is not more helpful. The staff of the House Financial
Services Committee has suggested—albeit with a protective “could
arguably”—that filing malattributed comments violates the federal
identity theft statute codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1028.170 This is quite a stretch.

168 Daniel J. Penofsky, Litigating Identity Theft Cases, 112 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 7 (2009;
updated 2020) (footnotes omitted). See also Keith B. Anderson, Erik Durbin & Michael A.
Salinger, Identity Theft, 22 J. ECO. PERSPECTIVES 171, 174–75 (2008) (categorizing identity theft
into three buckets: misuse of a credit card, use of someone else’s identity to open new accounts
in their name or take out loans, and use of someone else’s name to access existing, but not open
new, accounts).
169 Wis. Stat. § 943.201. California is broader: “Every person who willfully obtains personal
identifying information . . . of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful
purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real property, or
medical information without the consent of that person, is guilty of a public offense.” Cal. Penal
Code § 530.5(a).
170 See Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2 & n.10.
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The original federal statute, enacted in 1982,171 was not about the
theft of identity in the contemporary sense at all; it was about theft of
identification. It made it a crime to produce, possess, or transfer a fake or
someone else’s ID. That has nothing to do with malattributed comments.
As amended, the statute reaches further, but is still all about the use of
documents or other “authentication features” such as holograms,
symbols, a sequence of numbers of letters, or other such item issued by
some sort of issuing authority. It is not about just pretending to be
someone you are not.
The only plausible argument under § 1028 rests on a provision that
makes it a crime to
knowingly transfer[] . . . or use[], without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid
or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a
violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any
applicable State or local law.172

The most obvious sorts of “means of identification” are ID cards of one
sort or another. Filing a comment under someone else’s name does not
involve the use of an ID card. But the statutory definition of “means of
identification” is broader, extending to “any name or number that may
be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify
a specific individual,” including “any . . . name.”173 Just using someone
else’s name, without more, could theoretically constitute the “use” of a
“means of identification” as long as that name can be used to identify a
specific individual.
However, just using someone else’s name is not the crime. The use
must be in connection with some other activity that is itself a crime—
indeed, a felony. So this provision just returns us where we began: is it a
felony to file malattributed comments? If so, it is a felony that violates not
one statute but two; but this section does not make it so.

171 False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982, P.L. No. 97-398, 96 Stat. 2009 (1982),
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
172 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2018).
173 Id. §§ 1028(d)(7), (d)(7)(A).
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In 2004 Congress passed the “Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement
Act,”174 prohibiting “aggravated identity theft.”175 Aggravated identity
theft occurs when someone “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person” in
connection with a set of enumerated felonies, all of which involve
obtaining money or other benefits through fraud.176 Like the provision in
§ 1028 just discussed, this offense is parasitic; it requires commission of a
separate, enumerated felony. In effect, then, it enhances the punishment
for another offense; it is not a stand-alone crime. For example, the Special
Counsel’s indictment of the Internet Research Agency et al. alleged
conspiracy to defraud the United States (count I), conspiracy to commit
mail and wire fraud (count II), and aggravated identity theft (counts III–
VIII) in that the defendants used “a means of identification of another
person”—social security numbers, dates of birth, home addresses—
“during and in relation to” the felonies of wire and bank fraud.
In our situation, the most obvious predicate offense would be
making a false statement, and the statute’s enumeration of covered
offenses does indeed include 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Aggravated identity theft
occurs if “during and in relation to” that felony a person “knowingly
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person.”177 Again, the most obvious examples,
in which the thief passes off a stolen or fake card, are inapplicable here.
But this section too defines the term “means of identification” as “any
name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other
information, to identify a specific individual.”178 Simply giving a name
can involve the use of a “means of identification” so long as the name
could be combined with other information to identify a specific
individual. So, for example, forging a payee’s signature on the back of a
check constitutes a “means of identification.”179 Most names, with no
other identifying information, would not be a “means of identification,”
because most names are insufficiently unique. So, in our setting, a
Pub. L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2018) (heading).
176 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2018).
177 Id.
178 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2018).
179 United States v. Morel, 885 F.3d 17, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing cases); United States v.
Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2015).
174
175
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comment that says it was submitted by “John Smith” does not involve use
of a “means of identification,” because the name alone is not enough to
pinpoint a specific individual.180 But the name as well as an address (street
or email), for example, could suffice. So a number of malattributed
comments arguably involve the “use[], without lawful authority, [of] a
means of identification of another person.” Still, that is not a violation of
the statute. That use must be “during and in relation to” one of the
enumerated felonies.181 If no other crime has occurred, as I have argued,
then there is also no aggravated identity theft.
D.

Criminal Impersonation

Most or all states have laws criminalizing false impersonation. All
require impersonation of a real individual for the purpose of gaining a
benefit or causing an injury.182 Former New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman suggested that malattributed comments may violate the
relevant provisions of the New York Penal Law.183
In New York, impersonation in the second degree consists of
“[i]mpersonat[ing] another and do[ing] an act in such assumed character
with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another,”184 and
specifically includes a prohibition on “[i]mpersonat[ing] another by
communication by internet website or electronic means with intent to
obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another.”185 “Impersonation” occurs
when one person assumes the identity of another particular individual; it
180 “A name alone, for example, would likely not be sufficiently unique to identify a specific
individual because many persons have the same name. Likewise, a date of birth by itself would
not be sufficient because multitudes of persons are born on the same day.” United States v.
Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2008).
181 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2018).
182 See generally Marie K. Pesando, 32 AM. JUR. 2D § 1, False Personation.
183 Eric Schneiderman, An Open Letter to the FCC, MEDIUM (Nov. 21, 2017)
https://medium.com/@NewYorkStateAG/an-open-letter-to-the-fcc-b867a763850a
[https://perma.cc/N5DY-URCQ] (“My office analyzed the fake comments and found that tens of
thousands of New Yorkers may have had their identities misused . . . . Impersonation and other
misuse of a person’s identity violates New York law . . . .”).
184 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(1) (McKinney 2020).
185 Id. § 190.25(4). First degree impersonation is limited to certain egregious acts when
pretending to be a law enforcement officer or prescribing physician and is plainly inapplicable
here. See id. § 190.26.
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does not violate the statute to “simply use[] some fictitious or assumed
name.”186 Thus comments with fictitious names would not violate the
statute. Nor would the use of a name that happens to exist in the real
world but cannot be linked to any particular individual who bears that
name. However, a comment that used a real person’s name along with an
email or mailing address would count as “impersonation.” And
submission of an electronic comment is a “communication by website or
electronic means.”
But impersonation alone is not a crime; the impersonation must be
with the intention to injure or defraud another. As discussed above,
malattributed comments are not fraudulent in any recognized sense. As
for injury, those whose identities were used feel injured. But it is unlikely,
and impossible to prove, that the submitter acted with the intent of
injuring the person whose name was used. Conceivably the injury is
inflicted knowingly, but knowingly is not the same as intentionally.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the “injury” suffices. Injury is not
limited to pecuniary harm. Reputational harm surely counts, for example.
But the injury must be real and consequential. In the leading recent case,
the New York Court of Appeals concluded that “the statutory terms
‘injure’ and ‘benefit’ cannot be construed to apply to any injury or benefit,
no matter how slight;” rather, “intent . . . to injure” requires an intent to
cause “real harm” or “substantial harm.”187
Conceivably a net neutrality enthusiast, particularly one engaged in
public debate, might suffer a reputational harm by being associated with
an anti-net neutrality filing. But any such harm is awfully minor and
easily combatted. The very visibility that arguably creates the problem (a)
dilutes it (because no one paying attention will be fooled by the comment)
and (b) is the means of solving it.188 As noted in Part IV,189 the most
compelling example, unlikely and so far only hypothetical, would be a
malattributed comment containing offensive or abhorrent content that
goes viral, which really could result in irremediable and serious
reputational harm.

186 People v. Chive, 734 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001); see also People v. Sadiq, 654
N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
187 People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 812–13 (2014) (emphasis in original).
188 As, for example, Karl Bode has shown. See Bode, supra note 57.
189 See supra Section IV.D.
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Conceivably the submitter of a malattributed comment is seeking
“to obtain a benefit” in the form of a preferred policy outcome.190 Again,
this is a far cry from the standard forms of benefit, which are pecuniary
or at least tangible. The two most common are getting money or avoiding
prosecution.191 The benefit here is far more abstract and attenuated.192
Perhaps the most interesting theory under which these submissions
might amount to criminal impersonation would be that the “injury” is
interference with the government’s ability to do its job. The New York
courts have frequently set out some variation of the following black-letter
proposition: “a person may be found guilty of criminal impersonation in
the second degree if he or she impersonates another with the intent to
cause a tangible, pecuniary injury to another, or the intent to interfere with
governmental operations.”193 There is a sense in which the comment is
such an effort, as I discussed above in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 371.194
Still, this theory faces an uphill battle. First of all, the key language is not
in the statute itself, it only shows up in opinions explaining the kind of
harm that the statute protects against. Second, this setting is enormously
different from that in the New York cases that invoke the interference
with governmental operations theory; those cases all involve the police or
the courts. Examples include driving with someone else’s license, giving
an arresting officer someone else’s name,195 pretending to be the victim of
a crime and telling the police you do not wish to press charges,196 or

190 The Penal Law defines “benefit,” not very helpfully, as “any gain or advantage to the
beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent
of the beneficiary.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(17) (McKinney 2020).
191 People v. Lynch, 34 N.E.3d 341, 344 (N.Y. 2015) (“With the [forged] non-driver ID card
in hand, defendant could give the appearance of a clean record, which would enable him to evade
his criminal history and obtain a loan or employment under a false identity.”); People v. Chive,
734 N.Y.S.2d 830, 835 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001); People v. Sherman, 455 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1982) (defendant admitted that he lied about his identity to arresting officer and threw
away papers reflecting true identity “in order to avoid problems or prosecution under his real
name”); People v. Pergolizzi, 400 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
192 Felix Wu has pointed out to me the analogy between this understanding of the requisite
injury and related principles requiring concrete and particularized injuries (or lost benefits) in
standing doctrines.
193 Golb, 23 N.Y.3d at 466 (emphasis added).
194 See supra notes 133–45 and accompanying text.
195 People v. Turner, 651 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
196 People v. Hooks, 896 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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impersonating an FBI agent.197 These are all a far cry from submitting a
malattributed comment in a federal rulemaking. It seems unlikely the
New York courts would expand the scope of this inferred application of
the statute so far.
E.

The Administrative Procedure Act

The final potential legal issue arises not under a criminal provision
but under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This is a very
different sort of challenge. The APA applies to the agency, not the
commenters, so the question is whether the APA requires agencies to
reject, or prohibit, or cleanse the docket of malattributed comments.
In the wake of the Wall Street Journal’s reporting on the net
neutrality rulemaking, several observers asserted that the notice-andcomment process was so defective that the rule was invalid.198 Given

People v. Sanchez, 643 N.E.2d 509 (N.Y. 1994).
See, e.g., Free Press Joins in Appeals Court Brief Against FCC’s Unlawful and Unpopular
Repeal of Net Neutrality Safeguards, FREE PRESS (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.freepress.net/news/
press-releases/free-press-joins-appeals-court-brief-against-fccs-unlawful-and-unpopular-repeal
[https://perma.cc/JF5N-GSWE] (statement of Matt Wood, Policy Director, Free Press) (“The
agency likewise ignored evidence from tens of thousands of consumer complaints, and looked
the other way when fraudulent comments filled its online filing system.”); Net Neutrality in the
United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Net_neutrality_in_the_United_States
[https://perma.cc/BRQ8-CHR9] (“[T]wenty two state Attorneys General filed suit against the
FCC, alleging among other things that the comment process had been corrupted, making the rule
changes invalid.”); Melissa Quinn, Millions of Phony Public Comments Muddle FCC’s Net
Neutrality
Vote,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Dec.
12,
2017,
12:01
AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/millions-of-phony-public-comments-muddle-fccs-netneutrality-vote [https://perma.cc/ERX4-XR3U]; Schneiderman, supra note 183 (objecting that
“the perpetrator or perpetrators attacked what is supposed to be an open public process by
attempting to drown out and negate the views of the real people, businesses, and others who
honestly commented on this important issue”); see also Bob Barr, Massive Fraud in Net Neutrality
Process is a Crime Deserving of Justice Department Attention, MARIETTA DAILY J. (Dec. 25, 2017),
https://www.mdjonline.com/opinion/bob-barr-massive-fraud-in-net-neutrality-process-is-acrime-deserving-of-justice-department/article_87a01d86-e9c5-11e7-af34-3bc55501c7a0.html
(“[B]efore too long, the voices of real people, expressing genuine opinions on regulations, will be
drowned out and ignored all together by those in power.”).
197
198

HERZ.42.1.1 (Do Not Delete)

2020]

1/13/21 10:43 AM

MALATTRIBUTED COMMENTS

61

Vermont Yankee,199 this objection can only rest on the APA, and many
voicing it specifically invoked the APA.200
But what exactly is the APA violation here? By definition those
submitting malattributed comments are not violating the APA; it does not
apply to them. If there is an APA violation, it must be in how the agency
handles the comments. Yet the APA says very little about that. The basic
APA obligation is that agencies consider the comments;201 courts have
broadened this obligation to require that in issuing a final rule agencies
respond to all significant comments.202 Given this, it is at least arguable
that not only are agencies not required to police for malattributed
comments, they must consider them. Of course, an agency may—usually
will—conclude that the comment says nothing of value and does not
require a response, and its malattribution could be one factor supporting
that conclusion (though not a conclusive one). But lots of comments add
nothing and go unresponded to. That does not mean the agency is under
an affirmative obligation to keep them out of or remove them from the
docket. Indeed, most useless comments could not be removed from the
docket. First, doing so would be inconsistent with the right to comment.
Second, doing so would make it impossible for a reviewing court to
199 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)
(holding that courts lack a general supervisory power over agency procedures and cannot impose
or invent requirements not established by statute or the Constitution).
200 Lapowsky, supra note 79 (“There are real questions about the integrity of the docket that
can and will be used against [the FCC] in court.”) (quoting Gigi Sohn); Klint Finley, FCC’s Broken
Comment System Could Help Doom Net Neutrality, WIRED (Sep. 2, 2017, 10:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/fccs-broken-comments-system-could-help-doom-net-neutrality
[https://perma.cc/TW6M-QUQ4] (quoting Gigi Sohn as stating that the agency might have an
obligation under the APA to remove fake comments from the docket and that “[a]t a bare
minimum, they should investigate these comments and if they can’t actually remove the
comments, they can and should disregard them as part of their consideration of record”); State
AGs’ Letter, supra note 16 (letter from nineteen state Attorneys General urging the FCC to delay
action because “the well of public comment has been poisoned by falsified submissions” and
seeming to take the position that it would violate the APA to consider such submissions).
201 See, e.g., Lilliputian Sys., Inc. v. Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., 741 F.3d
1309, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“An agency’s failure to respond to relevant and significant public
comments generally demonstrates that the agency’s decision was not based on a consideration of
the relevant factors.”).
202 See, e.g., Delaware Dep’t of Nat. Resources & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C.
Cir. 2015); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Am. Mining
Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470
(7th Cir. 1985).
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review the full record and determine, among other things, whether the
agency had in fact considered and responded to all significant comments.
203

It would be an APA violation to rely on malattributed comments
inappropriately. (This is not a proposition limited to malattributed
comments; it would violate the APA to rely on any comment
inappropriately. The challenge is explaining what counts as
“inappropriate.”) For example, if the agency tallied comments, basing its
decision on the level of support for this or that aspect of the rule, then it
would violate the APA to rely on malattributed comments. But we need
not go that far; it would already violate the APA to base its decision simply
on the number of pro and con comments, regardless of their authenticity.
If the idea of “polluting” or “corrupting” the docket was not a
metaphor but a reality, then there might be an APA violation. The Act
anticipates that the notice-and-comment process provides the agency
with relevant “data, views, and arguments.” If malattributed comments
somehow kept such input from the agency or made it impossible for the
agency to evaluate or understand the authentic comments, then to issue
a rule based on the “corrupted” docket would be an APA violation. It
would be akin to basing, say, an emissions limit on a computer model and
finding that there was a bug in the program so it spat out the wrong
results. But the analogy just does not hold. To some extent, the
malattributed comments can be identified and ignored; they do not
somehow rub off on the authentic ones. But more important, as noted
before, whether a comment is signed, anonymous, or pseudonymous, it
says what it says; it will be useful or irrelevant depending on its content,
not on the validity of the signature line. Therefore, it is not a violation of
the APA to read or to rely on a comment submitted under a false name.
As a question of administrative law, this arises not so much under § 553,
which in no way restricts what the agency can consider or who it can
listen to. It is a question of what counts as “reasoned decision-making”
that is not arbitrary and capricious and therefore subject to judicial

203 See Dooling, supra note 75, at 917–20. Of course, an agency can set reasonable
requirements—for example of civility or not revealing confidential information–for comments
and police those requirements. Id. at 905–15. But comments in violation of those requirements
are not merely unhelpful, they do affirmative harm. The affirmative harm from malattributed
comments is much less clear, as discussed in supra Part III.
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reversal under § 706(2)(a). It would not be reasoned decision-making to
count comments or to be swayed by the identity of the commentator. But
if a comment is relevant, factually accurate, and communicates
something of value, there is nothing arbitrary and capricious in an agency
making use of what it has to offer, regardless of whether the sender put
someone else’s name on it.
During the net neutrality fury, opponents of the rule promised that
they would challenge the process in court.204 And indeed, several petitions
for review asserted that one of the Order’s legal defects was that it
“conflicts with the notice-and-comment requirements of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553.”205 Strikingly, the briefs ultimately filed in these cases did not argue
that there had been an APA violation.206 When push came to shove a
bunch of very good lawyers seem to have concluded that that was not a
winning argument. I think they were right.
VI.

MOVING FORWARD

Some negative recommendations flow from the foregoing. First,
submitters of malattributed comments should not be prosecuted; they
have not committed a crime. Second, regulations that emerge from a
notice-and-comment process that included malattributed comments—
even millions of them—should not be set aside for that reason; there is no
harmful per se error in the comment process that requires a second goround. Third, there is no reason an agency cannot read and be informed
by a malattributed comment. It should give such comments, like all
comments, the weight they deserve; that weight is a function of their

204 See, e.g., Fung, supra note 59 (quoting Evan Greer of Fight for the Future as stating that
“this will absolutely show up in court if we get there”); see also Karl Bode, The FCC Is Blocking a
Law Enforcement Investigation Into Net Neutrality Comment Fraud, VICE (Dec. 12, 2017, 11:42
AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wjzjv9/net-neutrality-fraud-ny-attorney-generalinvestigation [https://perma.cc/87RP-DQAQ] (“Expect the agency’s failure to police comment
fraud to play a starring role in these legal arguments to come.”).
205 Center for Democracy and Technology v. FCC, No. 18-1068 (D.C. Cir.), Petition for
Review at 2 (Mar. 5, 2018); State of New York v. FCC, No. 18-1055 (D.C. Cir.), Petition for Review
at 2 (Feb. 22, 2018).
206 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, which was largely but not entirely in the agency’s
favor, does not mention the “fraudulent comments” issue. See Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
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content, not, in general, a function of the name of the submitter. It would
not be reasoned decision-making for an agency to tally comments,
malattributed or otherwise. But an agency can consider and rely on
useful, relevant, accurate information or arguments from any source.
Indeed, if it has not prohibited the submission of such comments (on
which more below) it must consider such comments.
Nonetheless, malattributed comments do cause harms. The
appropriate responses are not so much legal as technological. Tools that
are commonplace in other settings where identity is important—notably
online commercial or financial transactions—are adaptable to the
rulemaking setting. Others with more expertise than I have
recommended implementing CAPTCHA technology, adopting some
sort of outside verification for comments, using two-step verification or
confirmation email, or keeping track of and indicating the number of
comments submitted from any individual email address.207 All of these
have meaningful shortcomings at present. But some effort by agencies
and the General Services Administration to develop technological
responses that make it harder to submit and easier to identify
malattributed comments is appropriate. That work is already
underway.208
Finally, agencies can reduce the incentive to file malattributed
comments by refusing to consider them. To be sure, the APA requires
agencies to consider “the relevant matter presented.”209 A strong reading
of this provision would compel agencies to consider even malattributed
comments—which “matter” and were “presented”—as long as their
content is relevant to the rulemaking. However, on either of two theories
an agency could refuse to consider malattributed comments.
First, an agency can set reasonable rules for which comments it will
consider and which it will ignore. An agency can impose a deadline for
comments, require submission to a particular address or website, prohibit
use of profanity, and refuse to accept comments that contain confidential
See Singel, supra note 2; Weiss, supra note 167.
See U.S. General Services Administration, Managing the Federal Rulemaking Process,
https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/regulations/managing-the-federal-rulemaking-process
[https://perma.cc/F43R-B28Q] (describing beta test of reCAPTCHA on regulations.gov as “part
of ongoing efforts to support the integrity of the rulemaking process and manage the role of
software-generated comments”).
209 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
207
208
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business information.210 Refusing to consider malattributed comments is
no different. It leaves other channels open, imposes no burden or cost on
authentic commenters, and is easily complied with. Indeed, if an agency
can refuse to accept anonymous comments, which is undisputed, a
fortiori it can refuse to accept malattributed comments.
The second theory rests on the text of § 553. An agency need only
consider comments from “interested persons.” No agency has ever read
this language to limit the permissible range of commenters, and in
ordinary circumstances it should not be read to do so. 211 However, an
agency might conclude that someone who had no involvement at all in
the submission of “their” comment is not an “interested person” and so
the comment can be ignored. Of course, the actual, unnamed submitter
is an “interested person;” so the question is whether the agency looks to
the identity of the actual or the supposed submitter. Opting for the latter
is inaccurate but can be defended as a reasonable administrative rule.
Refusing to consider malattributed comments will not eliminate
them. First, agencies will not be able to identify all such comments, and
submitters know it. Second, submitters may have audiences other than
the agency—the press, the general public, legislators, a public relations
firm’s clients—and goals other than influencing agency policy (such as
undermining public confidence in the regulatory process). But it would
have some deterrent effect.
One other measure is appropriate. As discussed above, there are
situations where the identity of the commenter does matter. Suppose, in
the net neutrality rulemaking, a comment arrives that purports to be from
the General Counsel of Verizon, but is not.212 Or in a Department of
Transportation rulemaking someone falsely submits a comment on the
letterhead of General Motors or Ralph Nader. In general, the deception
will be obvious and therefore inconsequential. But that will not always be
the case, especially with less prominent figures. If the agency cares about
210 See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that agency was not required to consider comments submitted after the agency-imposed
deadline); Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wash. v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(same).
211 Michael Herz, “Data, Views, or Arguments”: A Rumination, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 351, 357–59 (2013).
212 See Lapowsky, supra note 79 (describing the FiscalNote gravitas score and observing that
“a comment’s gravitas score would be higher if, say, it was written by Verizon’s general counsel”).
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the source of the comment and has doubts, there is an easy step it can
take: ask. But suppose it is wholly duped, and so does not think to ask. It
has one other resource: scrutiny of comments for malattribution can be
crowdsourced by outside stakeholders who monitor the docket. For this
to be most effective, the agency should do two things. First, it should post
comments to regulations.gov in a timely manner. If the comments are not
available, they cannot be monitored. Second, it should use a reply period.
Reply periods in notice-and-comment rulemaking are unusual, though
some agencies—including, notably, the FCC—do provide them. Their
potential value is obvious; they also can be messy and create an incentive
for commenters to hold back their main points during the “regular”
comment period and only release them during the reply period so they
cannot be rebutted. ACUS has stopped shy of calling for reply periods
across the board but has endorsed their use as appropriate.213 One benefit
of a reply period is that it would allow the agency to crowdsource
identification of malattributed comments. The Verizon General Counsel
can easily check the docket for phony submissions in her name and
inform the agency. Indeed, this can happen even without a formal reply
period.
Finally, former FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth argues
for a simple deterrent to mass comments in all their forms: a commenting
fee.214 He suggests 49 cents. It is a classic economist’s response; a good
(agencies’ time, attention, and docket space) is being wasted, so charge
for it. The charge would duplicate the pre-online system, where
commenters had to bring the comment in person (which had a cost) or

213 See Administrative Conference of the United States, Rec. No. 2011-2, Rulemaking
Comments ¶ 6 (2011) (“Where appropriate, agencies should make use of reply comment periods
or other opportunities for receiving public input on submitted comments, after all comments
have been posted.”); Administrative Conference of the United States, Rec. No. 76-3, Procedures
in Addition to Notice & the Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking (1976)
(recommending a second comment period in proceedings in which comments or the agency’s
responses thereto “present new and important issues or serious conflicts of data”);
Administrative Conference of the United States, Rec. No. 72-5, Procedures for the Adoption of
Rules of General Applicability (1972) (recommending that agencies consider providing an
“opportunity for parties to comment on each other’s written or oral submissions.”).
214 Harold Furchtgott-Roth, How to Reduce Frivolous Comments in Federal Proceedings,
FORBES (July 21, 2017, 12:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/haroldfurchtgottroth/2017/07/
21/how-to-reduce-frivolous-comments-in-federal-proceedings/#18373a5e3e70
[https://perma.cc/4BLL-2SYX].
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pay postage. And it would likely have a meaningful impact on botgenerated comments, malattributed or not, without being a significant
burden on those submitting just one comment. Nonetheless, it is a bad
idea for reasons both real and symbolic. It is arguably inconsistent with
both the APA and the E-Government Act and would almost certainly
require legislative authorization even were it not. More important, rules
that make it easier for well-funded or corporate and institutional
commenters to participate than individuals, small businesses, and nonprofits are virtually always a mistake, even if the burden is slight. They
will have a disparate impact on who does participate and send a message
that the agency is just fine with such an outcome.
CONCLUSION
In the early days of electronic rulemaking, Beth Noveck celebrated
the benefits of lay participation in rulemaking: “Participation sharpens
democratic skills, instills a sense of civic responsibility, and deepens
democratic political culture. By cultivating participation in this domain,
participation reinforces democratic practice throughout civic life and
cultivates the moral imperative as well as the general will.”215 It is a happy
picture. It is also the complete opposite of, and mocked by, malattributed,
computer-generated comments filed over the names of individuals who
had nothing to do with the submission and may fundamentally disagree
with it. There is nothing to celebrate about such comments. Agencies
should make reasonable efforts to prevent, minimize, and silo them. But
they are not illegal, and they are not a cataclysm. They are pink eye.

215 See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 460
(2004).

